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GRA YMARKETS IN CYBERSPA CE
I. INTRODUCTION

Cyberspace' is the Rorschach test for legal scholars. To those advocating
greater contract and property rights on the Web, what one author refers to
critically as Lochnerization, 2 Cyberspace is a frontier waiting to be foraged
and settled as an extension of the marketplace in real space.' To those

In this Article, I use the term "Cyberspace" synonymously with "Internet," "Net" and "World
Wide Web." Technically, "Internet" refers to the set of protocols that govern the connections among
separate and distinct computer networks that has expanded from the Department of Defense's Arpanet.
MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS, WHAT WILL BE: How THE NEW WORLD OF INFORMATION WILL CHANGE
OUR LIVES 39 (1997)("Arpanet would lead to the Internet and the Web."). "World Wide Web" refers to

the particular means of communication among these networks; the Web rests on the technological
platform provided by the Internet. ("The Internet did not become a widespread cultural phenomenon
until the Web... hit the streets.") Id at 40. Cyberspace is a much broader term than either the Internet
or the World Wide Web; it refers to the set of legal, social, economic, and political relationships that
govern and connect users of the Internet. Cyberspace would technically include individuals who have
never logged onto the Internet but may be affected by its presence, because it serves as a conduit for
personal information. The Rorschach test mentioned in the text refers to the visions an individual sees
when examining the set of relationships that defines Cyberspace. By using the term Cyberspace
synonymously with Internet and World Wide Web, I do not mean to ignore the important differences.
Rather, my point is that whatever vision one has about Cyberspace will affect the structure of the Internet
and the World Wide Web. The other reason that I use the term Cyberspace is to underscore the problem
of making false analogies from real space and real property law to the arena of information. Cf.Id. at 2021 ("The other name we often hear, Cyberspace, is also flawed, because it evokes a gleaming otherworld ... But the action of the Information Marketplace is a part of everyday life. .. ."). While certainly
Cyberspace is part of everyday life, Cyberspace also offers a technological means to manage and distribute
products for the information marketplace. The differences are important to recognize even though the
underlying economic problems are the same. For a history of the Internet and World Wide Web, see id.
at 25-55. See also Barry M. Leiner et al., A BriefHistory of the Internet (last modified Feb. 20, 1998)
< http://www.isoc.org/internet/ history/brief.html > (recounting the conception and development of
the Internet). I am indebted to M. Ethan Katsh for my use of the term Cyberspace. M. ETHAN KATSH,
LAW IN ADIGITAL WORLD 28-33 (1995).
' Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of"Rights Management,"97
MICH. L. REV 462 (1998) (defining a group of cybereconomists whose legal conclusions are based in an
ideology of freedom of contract and strong property rights, rather than in a scientific or analytical
understanding of underlying economics or technology). The discussion in this article is intended as a
response to Professor Cohen's cybereconomists as well as to her characterization of economic analysis,
as applied to Cyberspace.
' The following are samples of such a perspective: Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in
Cyberspace,1996 U. CHL LEGAL F. 217 (1996); Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web
Sites, 1996 J. ONLINE L. 7 (Oct. 1996) <http://www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/hardy.htm>;
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace:DrawingBorders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609
(1998); Maureen A. O'Rourke, CopyrightPreemptionAfter the ProCDCase:A Market-BasedApproacb,12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53 (1997); PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE
FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOMS (1997). This perspective is distinct from the
libertarian perspective that is discussed later in this paragraph. I believe that the authors I have cited here
would advocate strong property rights in Cyberspace. However, there are some authors who start from
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advocating sharing of information and ideas on the Web, Cyberspace is a
communitarian haven, a locus for the development of individual autonomy
against a background of mutual respect and tolerance made impossible in
laissez-faire real space. 4 To others advocating unchecked and unregulated
freedom on the Web, Cyberspace presents the opposite ideal, one of
unfettered freedom made increasingly impossible in statist real space.'

a position of strong property rights but would acknowledge that, because of external effects and exclusion
problems, some regulation may be required. For a good example of such a perspective, see Dan Burk, The
Marketfor DigitalPiracy,in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 205 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997).
Professor Burk argues that, from a perspective of regulation, private regulation of the Internet may very
well lead to a race to the bottom because of the problems of externalities and exclusion. However, he
advocates that deeper regulation of the Internet be stayed until the harmful effects of such a race to the
bottom are actualized.
" See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & CoM. 509 (1996)
(analyzing the effects of cultural, social, and economic influences on the development of property concepts
with respect to Cyberspace). I am aware of the hyperbole in my characterization of all of the schools of
thought that I am discussing in this paragraph. This hyperbole should not be taken as ridicule or as
disagreement with any of these schools. All of these authors do have common ground; at the same time
there are important differences. My goal, in part, is to develop an economic model in this article that will
draw on the common ground. Professor Radin's vision is perhaps better characterized as a pragmatic one,
rather than as a purely communitarian one. Her prescriptions draw more on economic theory than on
a pure political theory of communitarianism. At the same time, and in light of her other work, her
pragmatic analyses of Cyberspace do further communitarian ends. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996). For a critique, see Kenneth J. Arrow, InvaluableGoods, 35J. ECON.
LIT. 757 (1997). Other communitarian visions are represented in the essays in PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE
INTERNET (Brian Kahin &James Keller eds., 1995), particularly the following: Beverly Hunter, Learning
and Teaching on the Internet.- Contributingto Educational Reform, at 85; Frank Odasz, Issues in the
Development of Community CooperativeNetworks, at 115; George Baldwin, PublicAccess to the Internet:
American Indian andAlaskan Native Issues, at 137; Carol C. Henderson & Frederick D. King, The Role
ofPublic Librariesin ProvidingPublicAccess to theInternet, at 154. These authors represent a vision quite
distinct from the 'cybereconomists" cited supra note 2, a vision grounded in shared property or,
alternatively, in an ethic of altruism and sharing. A related but ultimately very different vision of
communitarianism in Cyberspace is offered by Keith Aoki, who proposes the need for a new model that
reconfigures our vision of the private-public distinction and provides a role for multiple sovereigns. Keith
Aoki, ConsideringMultipleandOverlappingSovereignties:Liberalism,Libertarianism,NationalSovereignty,
"Global IntellectualProperty,and the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 443 (1998). See also Neil
Netanel, Asserting Copyright'sDemocratic Principlesin the GlobalArena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1998)
(emphasizing democratic goals of copyright in international enforcement with specific reference to the
gray market).
s See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, The Economy ofldeas, 2.03 WIRED 84 (1994)(arguing for more relaxed
protection of intellectual property in Cyberspace and reliance on encryption and other technological
means to protect information) and MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE
DIGITAL AGE (1998). Once again I acknowledge the hyperbole in the text. Mr. Godwin's vision, for
example, is in many places communitarian as well as libertarian. But it is useful to distinguish his views
from the strictly communitarian ones I described supra note 2. Mr. Godwin is grounded in notions of
individual liberty as a primary value to protect in Cyberspace. Communitarianism is protected to the
extent that freedom of association is one aspect of individual liberty. Mr. Godwin's views are also distinct
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Whether seeking replication of markets, redemption from markets, or
restitution from states, cyber thinkers seek to imprint their vision on the yet
uncolonized arena of Cyberspace.
Despite the differences in perspectives, libertarian, communitarian, and
Lochnerian theories ironically converge into one arrangement for
Cyberspace transactions: balkanization, or the dividing up of Cyberspace
into private domains restricted through contract or property. The
libertarian prescription of individual rights would lead to the development
of technology to create proprietary rights in Cyberspace. Those citizens
seeking open access would be able to maintain openness; those seeking
privacy would have the technological means to do so. Communitarianism
would also create incentives for those wishing to exit from a regime of shared
property to expend resources on developing technological means to exclude.
However, a communitarian vision would also be consistent with a rule of
law in Cyberspace where legal mechanisms are used to protect individual
rights within a domain of shared property. Finally, the Lochnerian position,
as developed by Julie E. Cohen, 6 would also lead to balkanization as legal
rules are developed through the mix of intellectual property, state common
law, and sui generis rules. All three visions of Cyberspace would promote
balkanization. For libertarians, balkanization occurs through technology;
for communitarians, through a mix of technology and law; and for
Lochnerians, through law. The fact that each vision would promote
balkanization suggests that each is part of a more general theory of
Cyberspace. In this article, I offer an understanding that has largely been
ignored in the scholarly and practical literature on Cyberspace, one that I

from those of the cybereconomists, described supra note 2. While the latter are grounded in principles
of property, Mr. Godwin is grounded in individual freedom. An alternative libertarian view of
Cyberspace is offered in CARL SHAPIRO& HALR. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE
TO THE NETWORKECONOMY (1998). Shapiro and Varian offer business advice for exploiting commercial
value in the sale of information-based products. Although the authors offer an economic, rather than a
political, analysis of Cyberspace transactions, their basis in economic liberty is within the libertarian
vision and is distinct from the pure property rights notion of the Cybereconomists. The strategies that
Shapiro and Varian propose are ones that maximize efficiency as opposed to ones that protect property
or contract rights as natural rights.
6 Cohen, supra note 2.
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contend can bring together the various strands of thinking. Cyberspace is
the locus of gray markets7 in information.
A gray market is defined as an unauthorized distribution network for a
lawful product. In a black market, it is the product itself that is illegal; in a
gray market, it is the means of distributing the product that is the source of
the problem. For example, the sale in the United States of perfume that is
designated for sale only in the European market would be a gray market sale.
From one perspective, the question of legality of the gray market seems
trivial. If the perfume in my example is not meant for sale in the United
States, then in a sense the sale must be illegal. But the legality or illegality of
the sale hinges upon the source of the restriction. The sale of Cuban cigars
in the United States would be a black market sale since federal law prohibits
such sales. The sale of a Porsche that is distributed in the European market
through European retailers would be a gray market sale if done by someone
not authorized by the Porsche manufacturer to make such a sale in the
United States. The gray marketer has not breached a contract with the
European distributor or with the manufacturer of the automobile, since
there is no privity of contract. The gray marketer also has not committed
a tort, nor has he caused a breach of contract between the Porsche
manufacturer and the distributor.
When I say that Cyberspace is the locus of gray markets in information,
I mean that Cyberspace permits the creation of unauthorized distribution
channels for information and information products. Cyberspace is a
medium for the distribution of information. This medium is different from
other technologies, such as the printing press, the telephone, or the
photocopying machine, because it provides sizeable reductions in the costs
of producing, distributing, and accessing information.
Whenever
transportation and other transaction costs are low, one would predict gray
markets, or unauthorized distribution channels, to arise. In Cyberspace, the
biggest example of unauthorized distribution channels is provided by
hypertext linking, the creation of text which permits a user to directly access
one website from another. The use of hypertext linking creates interesting
conflicts between those who believe that all linking should be permitted and

' For background on the law and economics of gray markets, see Shubha Ghosh, An Economic
Analysis ofthe Common ControlExceptionto GrayMarket Exclusion, 15 U. PA.J. INT'LBUS. L. 373 (1994);
SETH E. LIPNER, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GRAY MARKET GOODS (1990); Nancy T.
Gallini & Aidan Hollis, A ContractualApproachto the Gray Market, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 1 (1999).
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those who believe that linking should be allowed only when authorized by
the party whose website is being linked. I contend that linking is a form of
gray marketing. I also argue in this article that the distribution of free ware
(computer applications distributed for free) is another example of gray
marketing in Cyberspace.
Finally, this article delineates the law and economics of gray markets and
applies the analysis to Cyberspace. Not only do I develop parallels between
gray markets in real space and gray markets in Cyberspace, but I also
conclude that the allocation of rights in Cyberspace hinges upon the
distribution of rights in what Professor Carol Rose has recently dubbed
"limited common property," which describes commons that are partially
excludable.8 Professor Rose's terminology of "limited common property"
is akin to what economists call "club goods."9 The economic theory of club
goods provides a foundation for Professor Rose's model of Cyberspace as a
regime of "limited common property." In a companion paper,1" I draw on
the economic theory of club goods as a description of Cyberspace
transactions to show how a regime of "limited common property" implies
the emergence of gray markets. In this paper, I develop a legal model for
understanding Cyberspace transactions that centers on gray marketing.
Before defining what I mean by gray markets in Cyberspace, it is
important to understand what gray markets are in real space. The broad
definition of gray market is a market involving the unauthorized distribution
of goods and services. Gray markets can be contrasted with white and black
markets. The white market represents the distribution of goods through
authorized agents, ones permitted by contract or regulation. However, the
black market represents the distribution of a good or service that is unlawful
to distribute. Thus, a black market itself is illegal, because the good or
service distributed is itself illegal to use or to sell. In a gray market, the good

Carol M. Rose, The Several FuturesofProperty Of Cyberspaceand Folk Tales, Emission Tradesand
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REv. 129 (1998). Professor Rose defines "limited common property," as
.property held as a commons among the members of a group, but exclusively vis-i-vis the outside world."
Id. at 132.
1 RicHARD CoRNEs & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIc GOODS, AND

CLuB GOODS (2d ed. 1996). See James Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1
(1965)(developing a general theory for club goods); Emilson C.D. Silva & Charles M. Kahn, Exclusion
and Moral Hazard, 52J. PUB. ECON. 217 (1993) (examining the effects of partial exclusion of individuals
from a public good).
0 Shubha Ghosh, Limited Common Property, Club Good Theory and the Law and Economics of
Website Regulation (July 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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or service itself is not illegal, but the means by which it is distributed may be.
I use "may," because it is difficult to determine whether gray markets entail
illegal or improper means.
Figure 1: Gray Markets in Real Space
Country X
Manufacturer

Country Y
(contrac

(unknown rdarionship)

(contrac

Distributor

(ontract)

Gray Marketer<--(contrct

Recognized relationship

I

Unknown type relationship

9'

Flow ofgoods
F

Country Z

Consumer

Flow of payrment

Figure One illustrates the problem. Suppose a manufacturer from
country X contracts with a distributor from country Y to exclusively
distribute a product in country Y. A gray marketer is an entrepreneur who
buys the product in country Y and resells the product in another country or
region, possibly but not necessarily the manufacturer's country, country X. "
While the distributor-manufacturer relationship is regulated by contract, as
is the gray marketer-distributor relationship, the question is the nature of the
legal relationship between the manufacturer and the gray marketer. 2 If the
manufacturer can enjoin the gray marketer, then the gray marketer needs to
"

Ghosh, supra note 7, at 375-83; LIPNER, supra note 7, at 4-8.

12For a discussion of the role of contract in regulating the gray market, see Gallini & Hollis, supra

note 7, at 18-19. A comparison of contractual and other means of regulating the gray market can be found
in Ghosh, supra note 7, at 409-29.
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contract with the manufacturer in order to distribute the product in other
markets. However, if the gray marketer can distribute with impunity, then
the manufacturer may need to seek out the gray marketer to foreclose the
distribution through contract. Thus, the gray market describes the
relationship between the manufacturer and the gray marketer, and
determines whether the activity of the gray marketer should be regulated by

contract or can occur freely. 3
A parallel can be drawn between the activity of the gray marketer in real
space and many activities in Cyberspace. For the purposes of this article, the
principal activity that I will address is linking; 4 however, I will provide other

" The United States case law on gray market goods demonstrates very divergent, often contradictory
approaches based, at times, on the need to protect intellectual property, and, at other times, on the need
to promote competition and free trade. For a discussion of the case law up to 1994, see Ghosh, supra note
7, at 378-86. Two recent opinions illustrate the disparities. In Quality King Distributors,Inc. v. L'Anza
Research Int'l,Inc., 523 U.S. 135,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961 (1998), the United States Supreme Court held
that the first sale doctrine barred claims of copyright infringement against gray marketers. This decision
severely limits the use of copyright law to enjoin the sale of gray market goods. (Copyright law, however,
is still available to enjoin the performance of gray market goods; see Red Baron-Franklin Park Inc. v. Taito
Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1548 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no first sale defense
to the infringement of public performance right)). Courts do, however, tend to enjoin gray market goods
under the Lanham Act. See Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA Co., 112
F.3d 1296, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that sale of gray market goods was
trademark infringement because the goods were materially different from United States trademarked
goods). The European Union has also moved towards regulating gray market goods through trademark
law. See Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int'l Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer Handelsgesllschaft mbH,
1998-7 E.C.R. 1-4799 (holding that exhaustion of trademark rights doctrine did not apply to sale of
trademarked goods outside the European Union).
14 For a discussion of linking, see O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace, supra note 3, at 684-87 (advocating
protection for linking on grounds of fair use); Dan L. Burk, ProprietaryRights in Hypertext Linkages, 2
J. INFO. L. & TECH. (1998) (visited Oct. 20, 1999) < http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/intprop/98_2burk/>
(concluding that copyright, trademark, or other business reputational rights are not infringed by
hypertext linking); Walter A. Effross, Withdrawal of the Reference: Rights, Rules, and Remedies for
Unwelcomed Web-Linking (visited Oct. 20, 1999) <http://www.law.sc.edu/sclr/EFFROSS.htm>
(advancing a solution to the problem of linking through the use of icons which would indicate limits on
the use of linked material); Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks,Frames,and Meta-Tags:An
Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA 243, 277 (1998) (advocating stronger intellectual property
protection against linking and indicating that technological solutions exist to address problems created by
confusion in the case law about the legality of linking); Edward A. Carazos & Coe F. Miles, Copyrighton
the WWW.- Linking and Liability, 4 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (Winter 1997) (visited Oct. 20, 1999)
< http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v4j2/cavazos.html> (emphasizing the limits of current intellectual
property law to regulate linking and warning against too great a reliance on technological solutions).
These articles provide a discussion of the case law up to 1997. An important recent case is Bernstein v. .C
Penney, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1063, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1998), in which the district court dismissed a
complaint brought by a photographer who claimed copyright infringement byJ.C. Penney in establishing
a series of links that indirectly connected to plaintiff's photograph, which had been displayed on the Web.
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examples throughout the article." I contend that linking is a gray market for
information. Just as a gray marketer distributes goods from one region to
consumers in another region, the linker brings information from one site to
consumers in another site. Regardless of the technology used, a creator of
a link provides an alternative distribution channel for the information
contained on the linked site.

"s Two other areas where my analysis would have applications are metatags and domain names, and
First Amendment issues.
With regards to metatags and domain names, Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), the private
organization that administers domain names on the Web, has been held not liable for registering names
that are likely to cause confusion among consumers or infringe upon registered trademarks. Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 949,44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1865 (C.D.
Cal. 1997). Cases against the infringer have been more successful under either trademark infringement
or trademark dilution theories. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220,44
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1156 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (finding trademark infringement in use of Playboy as keyword
or metatag to mark website); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1908 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (famous domain name squatter held liable for trademark dilution); Planned
Parenthood v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that use of "Planned Parenthood" as
part of domain name for pro-life website was trademark dilution). The domain name and metatag cases
illustrate the principles of gray marketing discussed in the text. The issue raised by each of these cases is
whether unauthorized use of a trademarked name is illegal. The courts focus on confusion issues, much
as they do in gray market good cases. Courts, however, also overlook consumer benefits from access to
certain marks, especially as captured through exceptions for non-commercial marks under the federal
dilution statute. See 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c) (Supp. 1II 1997) (creating a federal cause of action for dilution of
famous names with exceptions for non-commercial use). In Bucci, for example, the court considered the
use of the name "Planned Parenthood" to be a commercial use because the pro-life website was soliciting
donations. The free speech limitations on the federal dilution cause of action have yet to be clarified. A
gray market analysis would very likely excuse the use in Bucci and in similar cases in which the use of a
name is for a political purpose.
As suggested in the last paragraph, a gray market analysis would support First Amendment
exceptions for much activity on the Web that would be potentially infringing. The First Amendment has
been used to strike down state laws that would criminalize Internet transmissions falsely identifying the
sender, such as linking. See ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1356 (N.D. Ga.
1997) (striking down Georgia's statute). The First Amendment, however, has been found not to be
violated in cases involving e-mail dumping and a defamation claim brought against the manager of a
website for transmitting a communication that was defamatory. See, respectively, Compuserve, Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that spamming and other forms of
e-mail dumping were trespass to chattels); Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (holding website owner not liable for defamation in unknowingly transmitting defamatory
communication because the website owner is entitled to the same protection as a distributor of
publications). The gray market analysis in this article would support broader First Amendment
protection than either of these cases. For further discussion of issues, other than linking, to which my
gray market analysis would apply, see Dan L. Burk, TrademarkDoctrinesforGlobalElectronicCommerce,
49 S.C. L. REv. 695 (1998); Ira S. Nathenson, Spamdex, Heavy Meta, and Invisible Ink: Navigatingthe
Internet Infoglut (1998) (on file with journal).
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Figure 2: Gray Markets in Cyberspace
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The parallel between gray markets in real space and gray markets in
Cyberspace is drawn in Figure Two. In real space, the problem created by
gray marketing is one of specifying a legal regime to govern the relationship
between the gray marketer and the manufacturer. In Cyberspace, the
analogous problem is two-fold: first, the relationship between the linker and
the owner of the website must be determined; second, the website owner's
right to control the flow of information from the linker to the end user must
be determined. As I discuss extensively in Part Im of this article, the legal
regime governing gray marketing in real space offers important lessons for
gray marketing in Cyberspace.
Even if one accepts the analogy between gray markets in real space and
gray markets in Cyberspace, the natural question is what is its value. At one
level, the answer to this question is that gray marketing offers an alternative
to the property-based metaphors that many scholars have adopted to
understand Cyberspace. Some scholars have espoused notions of "fencing
Cyberspace" or "drawing borders" or "mapping," by assuming that a real
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property model is the one appropriate for Cyberspace. The natural corollary
is that legal infringement of rights in Cyberspace should be called "trespass"
or perhaps "nuisance."16 But the imprinting of a real property model onto
the new set of technological, social, and economic relations created by
17
Cyberspace imports property rights based on rigid, individualistic rights.
However, use of this metaphor swallows up the interesting questions. Even
those who advocate a shared regime are forced to argue in real property
terms, talking about easements or public use or joint property regimes."1
The gray market analogy, on the other hand, starts from the assumption that
there are certain undefined rights governing particular relationships in
Cyberspace. The analogy provides a framework to resolve the legal
problems in a way that takes account of the economic relationships in many
Cyberspace interactions.
The gray market analogy also resolves the problem of interdisciplinary
approaches in the law, a problem sometimes referred to as the "law of the
horse." 9 Is Cyberspace law governed by unique principles of law, never
16 See, eg., the discussion in O'Rourke, FencingCyberspace,supra note 3, at 640 (identifying arguments

for strong property rights regime in Cyberspace). The courts on occasion also adopt an analogy with real
or personal property regimes. See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1024 (holding that
spamming was trespass to chattels).
" This argument is elaborated in a communitarian framework by RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES, supra note 4 and Aoki, supra note 4. This argument has also been made in opposition to
a top-down model of rule making in Cyberspace by Johnson and Post, who demonstrate that the rules
of real space almost certainly do not apply to Cyberspace. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
Borders-The Rise ofLaw in Cyberspace,48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996). Lawrence Lessig is skeptical of this
separation between real space and Cyberspace, characterizing Johnson and Post's position as one of
deference to institutions and rules that emerge in Cyberspace. Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996). The gray market analogy is intended to bridge the gap in this debate. By
thinking in terms of transactions in Cyberspace as gray market ones, we can bridge the chasm between
real space and Cyberspace and resolve the problems seen by Professor Lessig. Gray markets also offer an
alternative to the real property models that underlie and distort many analyses of Cyberspace, and, as a
result, also address Johnson and Post's concerns.
"aSee, e.g., Radin, Property,supra note 4, at 511-14 (describing property regime of shared rights based
on economic analysis). The real property metaphor is of course implicit in the "information
superhighway" metaphor which suggests that the Internet will provide ready access and connectivity in
ways similar to the great highway projects of the 1950s and 1960s. See KAHIN & KELLER, supra note 4,
at 3-4 (discussing the highway metaphor).
9 The reference is to Judge Frank Easterbrook's description of much interdisciplinary scholarship
that ignores basics and substitutes a deep and established understanding of a problem with dilettantish
appeal to irrelevant disciplines. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspaceand theLaw of theHorse, 1996 U. Ci.
LEGAL F. 207. Whether my endeavors are dilettantish, I will leave readers to decide. Economics,
however, does provide established tools to study much of the problem posed by the definition of rights
and duties in Cyberspace. My work in many ways does not invite the creation of "Cyberspace Law" or
the creation of a new interdisciplinary field. However, it is also not old wine in new bottles, for I am
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before seen, yet to be discovered, or is Cyberspace law governed by old and
well-established legal principles? The resolution is that Cyberspace law is a
little bit of the old and a little bit of the new. A real property model for
Cyberspace, not so subtly but often unconsciously, masks this debate by
purporting to demonstrate that Cyberspace must inevitably be colonized and
"lochnerized." For example, Professor O'Rourke in her article on linking
leaves the reader with the sense that linking, and perhaps many other
Cyberspace interactions, should be left to property law to regulate.2"
Professor Merges, similarly, in his articles on private licensing agencies
suggests that Cyberspace may ultimately be a regime of private,
individualized, maybe largely autochthonous units that are self-regulating.2 '
Each author relies heavily on a real property foundation for understanding
Cyberspace. Although each author carefully analyzes the economic and
social relationships implicated by Cyberspace, the presumption of a real
property model assumes away the answer: Cyberspace will be like other
regimes, divided up into a set of rights resembling what we have in real
space.
The gray market analogy allows us to be more careful in projecting real
space onto Cyberspace because the legal regime governing gray markets in
real space is equally uncertain. A mix of traditional doctrines and sui generis
rules better suggests what the legal regime governing Cyberspace will look
like. More importantly, gray marketing, once understood in Cyberspace,
will have implications and feedback for how we understand gray markets in
real space. The enthusiasts for a real property analogy, interestingly enough,
miss this secondary question: What can Cyberspace tell us about how real
space should be regulated?
The gray market analogy is proffered here as an alternative to the real
property metaphor that has been consciously and unconsciously applied to
Cyberspace. But an alternative is not necessarily an improvement, especially
if the suggested alternative is really just a clone. If the real property
metaphor inevitably leads to lochnerization of Cyberspace, a gray market
using economic theories that have been largely ignored in the area of Cyberspace transactions.
20 O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace, supra note 3, at 640-704; see also Cohen, supra note 2, at 481-85

(criticizing strong property rights protection in Cyberspace based on the principle of freedom of
contract).
CollectiveRights
21 Robert P. Merges, ContractingintoLiabilityRules:IntellectualPropertyRightsand
Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Robert P. Merges, The End OfFriction?PropertyRights and
Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115 (1997).
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metaphor must do so double fold.22 After all, at least a real property
metaphor allows for the possibility of envisioning Cyberspace as shared
property, a "virtual tenancy in common" among millions, if not a million fee
simple absolutes. However, this argument overlooks the advantages of
thinking of Cyberspace as an arena for gray markets. The key word in the
phrase "gray market" is "gray"; in some ways, it is unfortunate that the word
"market" is used at all because gray markets do not entail commodification.
Instead most gray market regimes describe regimes of imperfect- or even
non-commodification, in which politics and policy have their sway in
conjunction with, or often counter to, market transactions.2 3 The reaction
to the gray market analogy should logically come from the strong CyberLochnerians. But this wing may be solaced by the presence of the term
"market" in "gray market"; for this phrase allows us to use a wider set of
tools from law and economics to understand Cyberspace. The problem for
the Cyber-Lochnerian wing is applying these tools to the production and

' For example,John Perry Barlow is very much opposed to thinking of information in terms similar
to economic analysis of personal property. As he states, it is meaningless to speak of distribution of
information since information cannot be distributed like goods. Instead he speaks of the dissemination
of information. See Barlow, supra note 5, at 87. I think that this point is largely semantic. Perhaps
information is really "disseminated" and not "distributed," but the underlying economic relationships are
the same regardless of the verb used. Barlow suggests that information is different from goods because of
the lack of non-rivalry. As he states, when a good is distributed, the distributor loses possession and use;
when information is disseminated, the disseminator loses neither possession nor use. But, of course, goods
are not completely rival. For example, under a chattel mortgage, I can sell a good to someone and retain
the right to reclaim the good if the buyer fails to make payment. Rights in goods (and in real property)
can be carved up in a number of ways that permit joint ownership and sharing; many of these divisions
of rights implicate issues similar to the dissemination of information. What is relevant for much legal and
economic analysis is the allocation of rights rather than whether something has been distributed or
disseminated.
Professor Cohen would perhaps also disagree with my attempt to develop an economic theory of
Cyberspace transactions that is admittedly grounded in neoclassical economics. I agree with much of what
Professor Cohen says about neoclassical economics as applied to intellectual property transactions and
especially the reification of "property" and "contract" among cybereconomists. See Cohen, supra note
2, at 515. I am also sympathetic to her power and public choice alternatives to the neoclassical model.
My work in this article overlaps with and builds upon her ideas of externalities, especially the positive
externalities associated with information and information networks. As I show in this article, externalities
properly recognized in an economic model of Cyberspace result in conclusions quite different from the
cybereconomists that Professor Cohen criticizes. If bargaining power and public choice elements were
added to my model, Professor Cohen's criticisms would be given greater support. My conclusions,
however, indicate that there are more fundamental things that cybereconomists have missed: the nature
of information, the externalities that are generated from information, and the institutional structure of
information dissemination.
2 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 4, at 278-82 (pointing to the limits on territoriality and sovereignty
introduced by gray marketing).
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distribution of information in Cyberspace because this application does not
justify a regime of strongly protected property.
As this brief introduction suggests, the gray market analogy deepens and
expands our analysis of interactions in Cyberspace. In this article, I develop
the gray market analogy first by applying the legal regime regulating gray
markets in real space to gray markets in Cyberspace. I focus my attention
on the issue of linking, currently the principal and most controversial gray
market in Cyberspace. In Cyberspace, as in real space, the gray market is an
important counterweight to the white market. But to develop and support
this ultimate point, I should first elaborate on the meaning of gray markets
in real space and the strength of the analogy for Cyberspace, the topic of Part
II.
II. THE GRAY MARKET ANALOGY
Before dissecting and applying the gray market analogy in the context of
Cyberspace, it is necessary to flesh out what I find useful and powerful about
this analogy. In real space, gray markets can be viewed as a geographic
phenomenon. In an idealized world, if it is possible for one manufacturer to
supply the entire global market with his goods, the gray market would not
occur. This single manufacturer, like the single firm described in Coase's The
Nature of the Firm,24 is a convenient fiction for highlighting the problem of
transaction costs. Even if a manufacturer could produce enough to satisfy
global demand for his product, the product would have to be delivered to the
customer, the end user. The delivery, of course, occurs through distribution
channels regulated by contract law and possibly other legal rules. The extent
of delivery is limited by the ability of the manufacturer to contract, which
in turn is affected by geographic limitations. For example, the extent of
contracting required to deliver the product to meet demand in Region A will
depend upon the topography, demography, and boundaries in Region A. If
the population is dispersed, many distributors will be needed; if it is
concentrated, relatively few will be needed. Because of these limitations, a
manufacturer may fail to meet the total global demand. These limitations

24

R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937),
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may further affect the marketing of the product, such as through advertising
and information networks, and its price.2"
Against this background, gray markets arise. Gray markets provide
alternative distribution channels where it is costly for the manufacturer to
contract for distribution.26 Typically, the geographic limitations described
in the previous paragraph lead the manufacturer to cater to the high end
market.2
The gray market satisfies demand in the low end market.2"
Furthermore, the gray market can serve to prevent the counterfeit market.29
The gray marketed product is the authentic product, not a knock-off. In
contrast with counterfeit goods, which are produced by an entity disguised
as the actual manufacturer, the actual manufacturer produced the gray
marketed product. Typically, counterfeit goods are purchased by those who
cannot afford the authentic items in the regional market. Gray market goods
also fulfill this demand. Gray marketers typically buy products overseas and
distribute them below the price of authorized dealers. Since the gray market
goods, in contrast to the counterfeit goods, are authentic, gray markets serve
the beneficial purpose of satisfying the low end of the regional market and
pre-empting the market for counterfeit goods.
Transportation and transaction costs also set important preconditions for
the emergence of the gray market. If transportation costs are high, gray
marketing will be difficult to achieve." However, if transaction costs are an
impediment to the manufacturer, then they should equally be an
impediment to the gray marketer. The relevant transaction costs for the two
agents are, of course, different. The manufacturer must find the correct
number of distribution outlets that will allow distribution of his product in
order to maximize his returns. Given the costs of contracting described
above, the optimal number of distribution outlets may not necessarily result

25 JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 279-87 (1989); see Gallini & Hollis,
supra note 7, at 3-5 (defining gray market); DAVID SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 200-29 (1989)

(describing price discrimination).
26 Gallini & Hollis, supra note 7, at 5; Ghosh, supra note 7, at 411-14.
2, The high end of the market is measured by the willingness of the consumers to pay. Willingness
to pay is determined by factors such as income, preferences, and wealth.
28 The low end of the market is measured by the consumers' lack of willingness to pay. Those
consumers who are not willing to pay above a certain price for a given product will be serviced by typical
retail outlets, such as K-Mart or Sam's Club. These outlets are designed for mass consumption and
sacrifice quality for a lower price.
A counterfeit product is a knock-off of a genuine product.
' See Ghosh, supra note 7, at 411-13 (explaining the problems solved by gray marketing).
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in an outlet in every region. Demand factors and marketing strategies also
affect the manufacturer's decision. In contrast, the gray marketer has a much
simpler decision; she must identify a distribution outlet in Region A,
purchase the product, and find a distribution outlet in Region B in which to
sell the product. The relevant factors affecting this decision are the prices in
Regions A and B and the costs of moving the goods from Region A to
Region B. If the cost of moving is low relative to the price differential, then
gray marketing will be profitable and will occur. Further, one would expect
that as the transportation costs fell, gray marketing would increase.1
One of the key characteristics of Cyberspace is that through the
technology of the Web, the cost of transporting information is negligible. 2
Search costs are further reduced through more powerful search engines and
hardware. The costs of access also fall drastically as the power of the
machine and interconnectedness increase. The problem from the perspective
of the manufacturer of information, however, is one of congestion.
Suppose an entrepreneur has created a compilation of data that she wants
to share with the public. There are several methods for distribution and
dissemination of the new compilation. The first, of course, is passive
dissemination: create a website with the compilation containing key search
terms and hope that enough people hit upon it in their searches. Clearly,
this would not be the most efficient means of distribution. Alternatively, the
entrepreneur could contract: sell advertising that would lead to the site in
both real and cyber media. Thus, the technology of the Web does not
necessarily lower the costs of distribution for the manufacturer of the
information. This combination of the lower costs of moving information
in Cyberspace, as opposed to in real space, and the potential increase in the
cost of contracting in Cyberspace (because of the large number of
contracting parties) provides a precondition for gray marketing. The gray
market analogy is one worth pursuing to understand the economic and social
relations implicated in Cyberspace.
Although I believe that the gray marketing phenomenon is quite
common in Cyberspace, for the purposes of this article, I will illustrate this
phenomenon with the best example of what I mean by gray markets in
Cyberspace: linking. The technology of linking is relatively easy to
"

See TIROLE, supra note 25, at 140-41 (discussing transportation costs).

32

See Merges, End of Friction,supra note 21, at 116-18 (discussing reduction of transaction costs in

Cyberspace).
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understand and is so common that many readers may take it for granted.
Hypertext linking, the most common form, allows the user of one website
to jump to another site that may have related information.3 3 The hypertext
link is created by the owner of a site as a means of facilitating use. The link
essentially combines the functions that we associate with a library staff at a
closed stacks library. The hypertext34 in the website is code for the URL"
of the site to be linked; it is like a user telling a member of the library staff
that he wants a certain book by a certain author. The information can be
conveyed to the librarian in many ways: through a call number, through a
last name and title, or sometimes simply through the title. Once the user
clicks on the hypertext, the URL of the linked site is called up, just like the
librarian going to the shelf to retrieve the requested book. Finally, if the
URL is valid and the site is active, the linked site is displayed on the screen,
just like a book waiting for the user at the Circulation desk. Hypertext
linking is the modern version of the closed stacks library in Cyberspace.
And just as the closed stacks library is a substitute for open stacks, where the
user can browse and retrieve the book personally, hypertext linking is the
equivalent of the user finding the URL and retrieving the site himself.
Hypertext linking is the most familiar form of linking; framing36 and
IMG37 are two other common forms.3" Both framing and IMG incorporate
elements of the linked website into the linking site. Although these two
forms of linking implicate different issues from hypertext linking, issues I
address more closely below, all three forms of linking constitute a gray

"' See O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace, supra note 3, at 631-34 (explaining how hypertext linking
works); see also KATSH, supra note 1, at 195-211 (explaining how hypertext linking creates a "seamless
web").
14 Hypertext has been described as something that is "easier
to demonstrate than to describe."
KATSH, supra note 1, at 199 (footnote omitted). If linear writing flowing from a beginning to an end is
"text," then hypertext is a collection of texts connected with a particular path of navigating from
one text
to another. IdL at 201-02. From a mathematical perspective, "text" is a scalar quantity ha'ving only
magnitude, while hypertext is a vector, having both magnitude and direction.
" "URL" stands for Universal Resource Locator, the technical term for a website address (such as
http://law.gsu.edu/sghosh).
36 Framing is a form of hypertext where the text is surrounded by borders that remain fixed as the
reader moves through the Web pages while the text content changes. See O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace,
supra note 3, at 637-39 (discussing linking by framing).
17 An IMG, or image link, creates a link with graphical
or pictorial material. While an ordinary link
connects the user with a different Web page, an IMG link transports a copy of graphical or pictorial
material from the linked page and reproduces it on the linking page. Id. at 655-56 (discussing linking by

IMG).
1 Id at 631-34 (describing each of the three types of linking).
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market in information. Just as the gray marketer distributes goods from one
region in real space to another, the linker conveys information from one part
of Cyberspace to another. The relationships between manufacturer, gray
marketer, and customer are analogous to the relationships between the
owner of the linked site, the linker, and the end user.3 9
This homology has two important implications. First, the relationship
arises even if Cyberspace is in fact Lochnerized. The existence of linking,
according to some scholars, will invariably result in the balkanization of
Cyberspace. If linking is legally permitted, website owners will convert their
sites to subscription sites requiring a password and possibly fees to access;
end users will have to pay for access.'
Technological solutions will
substitute for legal restrictions. If linking is held to be enjoinable, less
linking will naturally occur, and once again the result will be balkanization;
linkers would have to buy the right to link and the cost of information
access would be borne by the linker, as opposed to the end user. But even
in a perfectly balkanized regime of Cyberspace, where sites are protected
from access through contract or technology, gray markets can still arise,
although in a different form. Fences in Cyberspace, like border protectionist
policies in real space, cannot keep the gray marketer from operating.
Furthermore, protectionism would be even less effective in Cyberspace,
because of the relationship between the costs of transportation and the costs
of contract.4"
Second, the homology focuses the attention on the background economic
and social transactions that determine what the relevant transaction costs are,
which should be relevant in analyzing linking specifically and other
interactions in Cyberspace more generally. There is a presumption in the
literature that real property models apply to Cyberspace, whether the model
is one of shared or private property.4 2 But this presumption ignores the
varied sets of relationships that exist in Cyberspace. More importantly, the
presumption imposes the model of real property interactions onto
Cyberspace. To say that linking is like trespass, for example, assumes that

See Figures 1 and 2, supra Part I (graphically depicting these relationships).
o See O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace,supra note 3, at 625-26 (discussing Web business models).
See supra notes 31-30 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between costs of
transportation and contract in Cyberspace).
12 See, e.g., Hardy, Ancient Doctrine, supra note 3, at 9 (arguing that trespass law applies directly to
Cyberspace); Radin, Property, supra note 4, at 514 (arguing that property in Cyberspace evolves from
property in real space).
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relationships between websites are like the relationships between adjoining
parcels or their respective owners. Such a presumption ignores that
information differs from land, both in use and in value. A gray market
model invites more caution, partially because the law governing gray
markets is less settled, and partially because the model forces an inquiry into
the underlying structure of production and distribution of information.
But, of course, all analogies are imperfect, and the gray market analogy
can be subjected to several criticisms. I suggested in the previous part that
the critique from anti-commodificationism may be unsatisfactory. There are
still several powerful criticisms of my analogy that need to be addressed. I
focus here on the three principal ones that I have identified: (a) gray markets
in real space arise from price arbitrage, which has no clear analogue in
Cyberspace; (b) gray markets in real space arise from schemes of price
discrimination by the manufacturer and distributor that have no clear
analogue in Cyberspace; and (c) the contracting issues in real space implicated
by gray marketing are distinct from the contract issues implicated in
Cyberspace.
A. THE GRAY MARKET AS ARBITRAGE

The gray marketer in real space buys low and sells high.43 Though the
pricing mechanism has not been fully implemented in Cyberspace, the gray
market analogy applies, because the heart of gray marketing is not price
arbitrage but unauthorizeddistribution. Since the price system is the most
extensive mechanism for allocating goods and services in real space, gray
marketing in real space naturally would entail questions of price. But gray
marketing can occur in subtle ways that may not involve price arbitrage.
The classic case of InternationalNews Service v. AssociatedPress" provides
such an example. International News Service (INS) took Associated Press'
(AP's) stories as AP distributed them through authorized agents and
redistributed them in "new packaging" to the West Coast. Although INS
was not taking advantage of a price differential, it was taking advantage of a
time differential and in effect distributing to an unauthorized market, one
not fully tapped by AP. What is important in the INS case is the
unauthorized distribution of the news, characterized by the Court as
" Gallini & HoUis, supra note 7, at 1-2; Ghosh, supra note 7, at 411-13.
" 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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misappropriation; INS was a gray marketer of news under the facts of that
case. Similar unauthorized distribution characterizes InternationalNews
Services' progeny, such as Motorola, Inc.," in which the defendant was
providing sports scores through a different distribution mechanism. Thus,
a critique of the gray market analogy from the perspective of price arbitrage
is ineffective, for the issue in gray marketing is whether the unauthorized
distribution violates the law.
Furthermore, even if gray marketing in Cyberspace does not entail price
arbitrage, it may involve arbitrage of a different sort. INS' conduct
exemplifies non-price arbitrage. Because of the time difference betweenthe
East and West coasts, INS was able to obtain the relatively old news on the
East Coast and redistribute it as fresh news on the West Coast. In this case,
INS was exploiting the differential in the value of the information created by
the difference in time between the two coasts. Similarly, gray marketers can
take advantage of differentials in the value of information created by other
means. In the linking cases, linkers provide value by compiling various sorts
of information in one source; thus the arbitrage is based on the freshness and
packaging of the information. For example, in Washington Post Co. v. Total
News, Inc.," the company Total News created a website funded by
advertising that allowed the user to link to websites of major newspapers that
would appear on the Total News website in frames. The function Total
News provided was one of repackaging the information and thereby
allowing the user to scan newspapers and compare each paper's coverage of
an issue with that of other papers. By compiling the news, Total News
created a new product: a bundle of news gathered from a scattered set of
newspapers. Through compilation, Total News provided an arbitrage
function between low value scattered news and high value compiled news,
which it then distributed to users who could not afford to acquire
subscriptions to multiple newspapers.
In many ways the arbitrage implicated by gray marketing in information
is much like the arbitrage that occurs across fields of expertise among
academics. A person trained, for example, in economics may take ideas that
are well-established, possibly even trivial, in the field of market theory and

"s NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841,843,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1585, 1587 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding
that InternationalNews Service is still good law, but that broadcasting of sports scores by Motorola was
not misappropriation).
' Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 1997).
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apply them in the area in a novel, potentially high value way with payoffs
in terms of publication and scholarly notoriety. Although this example is
not intended as judgment upon the research in this paper, the example
demonstrates that arbitrage has a broad meaning beyond the exploitation of
price differentials, especially when information is involved. The gray market
analogy does not fail for lack of an analogue for price arbitrage in
Cyberspace.
B. GRAY MARKETS, DISTRIBUTION, AND PRODUCTION

Gray markets in real space result from price differentials that are a result
of price discrimination by the manufacturer and distributor of the product.4"
Price discrimination is the marketing of the same product at different prices
within the same temporal market. The classic example is differential ticket
pricing based upon the age of the customer. Other examples of price
discrimination are peak load pricing4" and volume discounts by retailers. In
the global market, setting different prices in different regions is a form of
price discrimination where the manufacturer charges different prices for the
same product based upon regional differences in consumption and tastes.
The gray marketer, by providing an alternative channel for distribution of
the product in one of the regional markets, undercuts the ability of the
manufacturer to price discriminate. Because price discrimination is not an
issue in Cyberspace, where many transactions are not metered by the price
mechanism, a criticism could be that my analogy of gray markets in
Cyberspace is not appropriate.
Once again this criticism hinges upon the fact that the price mechanism
is not fully operating in Cyberspace, while it fully operates in real space.
But, as with the arbitrage argument, the price discrimination argument
ignores both the ways in which information is marketed and the practices in
real space that facilitate price discrimination. By differentiating products,
manufacturers and distributors can facilitate discriminatory practices by

', I focus here on the economics of price discrimination, rather than on the legality of price
discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act. See TIROLE, supra note 25, at 133-62 (illustrating the
various aspects and applications of price and quality discrimination); see also ROBERT P. WILSON,
NONLINEAR PRICING 5-17 (1993) (explaining the motivations and practical uses of price discrimination
via non-linear pricing); SPULBER, supra note 25, at 200-29 (providing a mathematical analysis of price
discrimination schemes); SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 5, at 19-53.
" Peak load pricing is the setting of a higher price at peak usage times. WILSON, supra note 47, at 262.
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segmenting the market into high end users, those willing to pay a high price,
and low end users, those willing to pay a slightly lower price. By segmenting
the market in this way, the manufacturer and distributor can charge two
different prices and capture a larger portion of the market. If the
manufacturer was forced to charge only one price for a non-differentiated
product, not only would she lose some sales to the low end of the market,
but she would also lose some of the surplus that would go to the high end
users. By segmenting the market, a manufacturer can increase her returns by
capturing a larger share of the market.
An example of segmentation is provided by pricing schemes for movie
tickets. Suppose elderly patrons would be willing to pay at most $4 each to
see a movie, while younger patrons would be willing to pay at most $7 each
to see a movie. If the movie theater charged $6, it would capture the
younger audience, but lose the older audience. By segmenting the market by
age (such as by giving a senior citizen discount reducing the price to $4 for
elderly patrons), the movie theater can expand its uses and its returns.
Information markets can be segmented in a similar way, through
packaging and metering of use, which may facilitate price differentials but
which also facilitates dissemination of information. Even if the price
mechanism is not directly functioning in Cyberspace, a website owner may
engage in segmenting the domain of end users for the purposes of further
disseminating information. For example, a website owner can create two or
more packages of information based upon characteristics of the end user or
intensity of use by the end user. Each of these mechanisms for segmenting
the domain of end users is like product differentiation in market settings.49
The only difference is that in real space, price is the form of discrimination;
in Cyberspace, quality is the relevant variable.
Product differentiation (and the resulting price discrimination) can occur
in both real space and Cyberspace, but the role of gray marketing may be
different in the two settings. In real space, gray marketing serves to
distribute goods to the low end of the market, expanding the amount
consumed in the marketplace with accompanying gains to consumers. In
this respect, gray marketing may subvert attempts to price discriminate in
real space by providing a competitive source of goods in one of the

4 See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 5, at 80-81 (offering an economic analysis of Cyberspace
transactions).
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manufacturer's markets."0 On the other hand, if the gray marketed goods are
different from the products sold in the country in which the gray marketer
distributes, gray marketing may support price discrimination by further
differentiating the products of the manufacturer."1 In the first case, gray
marketing is a positive phenomenon from the perspective of consumers and
a negative one from the perspective of manufacturers. In the second case,
gray marketing benefits consumers and may even help the manufacturer.
The role of gray marketing in Cyberspace is more complex. While the gray
marketer can repackage or provide low cost links to information and thereby
aid the end users, the gray marketer in Cyberspace, like his analogue in real
space, may take a free ride by using the efforts of the original creator of the
information. However, the gray marketer may also provide a benefit to the
original creator by further disseminating the information produced. 2 The
gray marketing analogy is not inappropriate in Cyberspace simply because
price discrimination is localized to real space. On the contrary, differentiated
products and quality discrimination play a key role in Cyberspace
interactions, and gray marketing through linking fills in the resulting gaps.
C. GRAY MARKETS AS IMPERFECT CONTRACTING

The gray market problem in real space is, from one perspective, a trivial
problem. According to one view of the gray market, if the gray marketer
wants to distribute in Region B, he should be required to buy that right from
the manufacturer. Region B may be a market yet to be tapped by the
manufacturer, but currently unexploited because of transaction costs. The
gray marketer can lower transaction costs for the manufacturer, and then
share his rewards from exploiting a previously untapped market with the
manufacturer who initially produced the good. In accordance with this
view, a court, in deciding a gray market case, should provide the missing

's See Gallini & Hollis, supra note 7, at 7-11 (exploring the social impact and policy implications of

gray market goods, and recommending their exclusion except under special circumstances); Robert J.
Staaf, Tbe Law and Economics ofthe InternationalGrayMarket: QualityAssurance,Free-Riding,and Passing
Of 4 INTELL. PROP. L. 193, 233-35 (1988) (providing empirical and theoretical support for the role of
gray markets in promoting competition and undercutting market division).
" See Ghosh, supra note 7, at 392-97 (explaining the implications of SS 42-43 of the Lanham Act on
gray market goods, with examples).
"2See Ghosh, supra note 7, at 383-409 for a discussion of the various costs and benefits of gray
marketing with examples.
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contract between the gray marketer and the manufacturer through a
compulsory license requiring the gray marketer to compensate the
manufacturer for the license that was neither obtained nor sought. Under
this view of the gray market, my analogy is not helpful to the Cyberspace
debate: contracting is the solution. 3
Before attacking the implications of this argument for Cyberspace, I
should point out that this argument overlooks some important aspects of
gray marketing in real space. First of all, if the manufacturer is involved in
market segmentation and price discrimination, compulsory licensing for gray
marketing would have an adverse effect on consumers. Gray marketing
when price discrimination exists may benefit the market at the expense of
the manufacturer."4 Second, the contracting argument assumes that the
manufacturer has the property right to sell his product in Region B.
Although on the surface this seems like a plausible assignment of rights,
closer scrutiny suggests its basic fallacy.
The manufacturer has the right to be free from unfair competition in the
sale of his product, but this does not mean that he has an unfettered right to
sell the product. For example, under copyright law, the first sale doctrine
limits the copyright owner's distribution right to the first sale; thus the
owner should extract as much of the rents from selling the protected work
in the first contract through which the work is sold.5 The copyright owner
does not have the right to control resale or redistribution of the work except
through narrow means. 6 In the gray market context, it is not clear that the
manufacturer has an absolute right to control the resale of his product after

53 See GaUini & Hollis, supra note 7, at 22-24 (offering a contractual solution to the problem of gray
markets).
' See Ghosh, supra note 7, at 409-14 (discussing the trade-off between market effects and loss to the
manufacturer).
" See WendyJ. Gordon, FairUseasMarketFailure:A Structuraland EconomicAnalysis ofthe Betamax
CaseandIts Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) (arguing that the fair use doctrine cures a market
failure when there are large transaction costs to licensing); Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer
Programsand Other Copyrightable Works in DigitalForm: The Implications of Sony, Galoob, and Sega, 1
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1993) (discussing the implications of fair use for technological innovation and
standard setting); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An EconomicAnalysis of Copyright Law, 18
J.L. & ECON. 325 (1989) (supporting fair use doctrine as a way of maximizing the value of the copyright
owner's work); Stanley M. Besen & Sheila Nataraj Kirby, PrivateCopying, Appropriability,and Optimal
CopyingRoyalties,32 J. LEGAL STUD. 255 (1989) (demonstrating that permitting some amount of copying
and sharing of intellectual property can increase value to the property owner).
17 U.S.C. S 106 (1998).
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he has contracted with the initial distributor."7 Whether the right to control
resale should exist, in other words whether that right should be assigned to
the manufacturer, is a question of transaction costs. The answer to this
question depends upon the underlying economic and social relations
implicated by gray marketing. The United States Supreme Court's recent
decision 8 to permit gray marketing through the application of the first sale
doctrine demonstrates that the manufacturer's right to control resale is far
from clear.
Extending the contracting solution to Cyberspace is equally suspect. As
with the property metaphor discussed above, the contracting solution
assumes a particular set of entitlements. The real question is what types of
entitlements areconsistentwith the types ofinteractionsthat occurin Cyberspace.
This question rests intimately on our conception of what these interactions
are and what they should be. Gray marketing is a powerful model for
understanding these interactions. Even though many scholars have turned
to contracting as the basic legal model on which Cyberspace should rest,
contracting does not resolve many of the more vexing problems.5 9 In fact,
contracting may exacerbate the underlying problems that lead to the
unauthorized flow of information through mechanisms such as linking. The
basic problem is that in Cyberspace the costs of disseminating information
are very close to zero, even though the costs of manufacturing the
information are not. It is in this environment that gray marketing arises in
real space and in Cyberspace; and it is for this reason that gray marketing is
difficult to contain.6"

' See the discussion in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911) in the
context of resale price maintenance; see also Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 339 (1908)
(discussing the limitation placed on copyrights under the first sale doctrine).
' Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1961 (1998); see infra note 78 and accompanying text.
s9See Cohen, supra note 2, at 481-95 (scrutinizing Cybereconomists' claims regarding the efficiency
of contracting for allocating rights in digital works).
' Bakos, Brynjolfsson & Lichtman discuss the pricing problems for information goods and suggest
that permitting sharing can actually increase the contract price for information goods under some
circumstances. They analogize sharing of information goods to commodity bundling of goods and
services. Yannis Bakos et al., Shared Information Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117,120-29 (1999).
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D. SUMMARY

In this part, I have elaborated on the gray market analogy and addressed
several potential criticisms. The gray market analogy works in many
dimensions: first to capture the problem of unauthorized distribution,
second to capture the differential costs of contracting and accessing
information, and third to capture the ways in which the domain of end users
can be segmented and differentiated. Taking these elements of the gray
market analogy, I now address two questions: what can we learn from the
law of gray markets, and what can we learn from the economics of gray
markets? I address each question in turn.
Im. COMPARATIVE LEGAL REGIMES IN
REAL SPACE AND CYBERSPACE
A. THE LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY GRAY MARKETS IN REAL SPACE AND
CYBERSPACE

In the previous part, I laid out an argument for the gray market analogy
as applied to Cyberspace transactions. Although I spoke of Cyberspace
generally, the specific transaction I provided as an example was linking. In
this part, I turn to the legal implications of the gray market analogy. Once
again, I will draw the implications for the activity of linking. As background
for the legal analysis, consider the following scenarios:
(1) I write an article on the law of Cyberspace. I present my own ideas
developed and expressed originally. But I also wish to incorporate the work
of others in my writing, and I do so through standard operating procedures
for researchers: I quote directly and attribute the quotes appropriately, or I
cite my fellow scholar's work directly, urging you to read it as a follow up.
Such use does not constitute a violation of copyright law or trademark law.6 1
61 Such a use would constitute fair use under copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. S 106 (1999) (laying out
standards for determining whether a particular infringement would constitute fair use and hence would
be protected); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073
(1985) (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) and stating that "[a] reviewer
may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages for the
purposes of fair and reasonable criticism"). Such a use also would not constitute trademark infringement,
which governs use of names or symbols in a way that causes confusion as to source. 15 U.S.C. S 1114
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(2) Suppose that I place my completed article on my website. In order to
facilitate your reading the articles that I cite, I link the titles and citations of
the articles from which I quote using hypertext, so that with a simple click
you can have my fellow scholar's work before you. Should the hypertext
linking make a difference in determining whether I violated any intellectual
property law? By using hypertext linking, have I taken something of value
from my fellow scholar, or have I simply provided the reader with a service:
easy access to more valuable information?62
(3) Consider the same problem in a commercial context. The mention
of a competitor's protected trademark for comparison purposes would
merely constitute fair use under trademark law ("trademark fair use") as long
as the advertiser does not create false association or disparagement.63 Use of
a competitor's trademark on a website for comparison purposes would also
likely constitute trademark fair use.
Now suppose that the
trademark-whether word or icon-is transformed into hypertext so that the

(1991). Even ifI
incorporate names and symbols into my research, this use would be protected as fair use,
because my purpose is non-commercial and the use is nominative. New Kids on the Block v. News Am.
Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1534 (9th Cir. 1992).
' Academic literature has consistently held that such a use should constitute fair use under copyright
and trademark law. See O'Rourke, FencingCyberspace,supranote 3 (arguing that hypertext linking should
be fair use under both copyright law and trademark law and urging limits in the application of contract
law and the doctrine of misappropriation); Edward A. Cavazos & Coe F. Miles, Copyright on the W'W .
Linking and Liability, 4 RICH. J.L. & TEcH. 3 (Winter 1997) (detailing potential bases for liability under
state and federal law for linking and possible defenses); Walter A. Effross, Withdrawal of the Reference,
supra note 14 (proposing technological solutions to limiting linking); Burk, supra note 14 (suggesting that
linking is no different from standard reference tools in research); Kuester & Nieves, supra note 14
(suggesting strategies and guidelines for website owners to escape liability under the intellectual property
laws).
The limited case law has not been as clear as the academic commentary. See Ticketmaster Corp.
v. Microsoft Corp., No. 97-3055 DDP (C.D. Cal. filed April 28, 1997) (still in pre-trial stage, but it
forwards allegations that hypertext linking constitutes trademark infringement and federal dilution);
Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 1997) (settlement in the
context of allegations that framing constituted trademark infringement); Expert Pages v. Buckalew, 1997
WL 488011 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1997). For a discussion of Ticketmaster Corp. and Total News, Inc., see
O'Rourke, FencingCyberspace,supra note 3.
63 Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores, 46 F.3d 1556, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(holding that the use of a trademark in comparative advertising where there was no likelihood of
confusion was not infringement); New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 302 (use of music group's
trademarked name in newspaper story is not infringement); see supra note 62 (discussing fair use within
Trademark law); but see Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a
trademark fair use defense when there was a possibility of consumer confusion as to celebrity
endorsement).
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consumer can click and "cyberleap" to another owner's Web page. Has fair
use become theft, trespass, or some other form of infringement?'
Commentators on this issue have focused on real property analogies
to
the use of hypertext to link different websites.6" One such analogy requires
that one imagines a fence surrounding each individual website; thus,
commentators have described the use of links as potentially a form of
trespass. The question becomes: what property rights does the creator of the
webpage have in his website? An analogue to this question lies in copyright
law: which elements of the website are protected expression and which are
open to fair use? Such an analogy prompts additional questions: what law
controls Cyberspace? Is it the common law of contract, property, and tort?
Is it the body of intellectual property law? Or is there some other set of
66
rules and standards yet to be developed and named?
The analogy to property in some ways presupposes an answer. My point
in this article is to draw a better and tighter analogy: linking through
hypertext and many uses in Cyberspace are examples of gray markets. The
principles developed in the "law of the gray market" should, at least, inform
if not prevail in drawing boundaries in Cyberspace.67
B. THE LAW OF THE GRAY MARKET IN REAL SPACE

The phrase "law of the gray market" is intentionally tinged with irony,
for legal analysis of the gray market is wrought with problems of definition
and application analogous to the problems pervading the law of

The cases cited supra note 15 demonstrate a range of theories based on both federal and state law.
There is clearly not one dispositive set of theories. The varieties of legal theories suggest that linking is
an activity in need of a descriptive and predictive model.
" The real property analogy is most striking in the title of Professor O'Rourke's paper, Fencing
Cyberspace,supra note 3. I do not disagree with the analogy; rather, I think that it islacking in some ways
and potentially limiting. The irony is that Cyberspace is not a place or a space in the three-dimensional
sense that real property conjures. Given how multi-dimensional Cyberspace is,we are perhaps like the
citizens of Flatland attempting to comprehend the three dimensional world. EDWIN A. ABBOTT,
FLATLAND: A ROMANcE OF MANY DIMENSIONS (Penguin Books 1984) (1884).
" For a debate over the proper model of Cyberspace law, see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law
and Borders-TheRise of Law in Cyberspace,48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (advocating a sui generis body
of Cyberspace law as distinct from the law governing real space) and Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996) (critiquing Johnson and Post's position as being too strong).
' See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 7 (surveying the case law); Staaf, supra note 50 (providing some
economic data demonstrating the benefits and costs of gray marketing).
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Cyberspace.68 Part trademark,69 part copyright," part unfair competition,7 1
part contract," part agency," "the law of the gray market" is far from a
coherent whole. Application to linking or other issues in Cyberspace seems,
in the first instance, far from fruitful. But the analogy is useful for two
reasons. First, linking and other uses in Cyberspace illustrate nascent
markets, markets yet to be developed. Similarly, gray markets fill in the gaps
in the distribution of products in the global and regional marketplace.
Second, links work in many ways like gray markets by providing an
alternative, albeit unauthorized, channel for the distribution of a product.
In the United States, gray marketing is regulated by state and federal laws.
New York and California have enacted statutes that expressly limit the
selling of gray market goods; however, the statutes have largely been
unenforced.74 Federal law also limits the sale of gray market goods within
the United States. Section 526 of the Tariff Act, enacted in 1926, restricts
importation of gray market goods, but has been limited by two fairly broad
exceptions based on the agency relationship between the United States
owner of the trademark and the foreign distributor. 5 Section 337 of the
Tariff Act, a more recent provision, provides an administrative remedy with
the International Trade Commission; however, this remedy has rarely been
sought.76 The number of legislative measures to control the gray market
contrasts starkly with their effectiveness.
In contrast to all of the legislation in the United States, in the European
Union the gray market has proceeded without legislative restriction.
Though the European Union has not passed legislation regulating gray

6'

For definitions of gray markets, see Ghosh, supra note 7, at 373-74 and LIPNER, supra note 7, at 1.

69 See, e.g., A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923) (finding trademark infringement by seller

of gray market goods).
71 See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1961 (1998) (surveying copyright cases dealing with the gray market and holding that the first sale doctrine
is a defense against copyright infringement through gray marketing).
7' Lever Bros. v. United States, 652 F. Supp. 403, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1820 (D.D.C. 1987).
72 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Super Scale Models, Ltd., 934 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1991).
73 K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897 (1988).
71 N.Y. GEN.Bus.LAW S 218-99 (Consol. Supp. 1999); CAL. CIv.CODE SS 1793.1,1797.80-86 (West
1998).
" Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, S 526(a), 42 Stat. 858,975 (current version at 19 U.S.C. 5 1526 (Supp.
1997)); see K-Mart Corp., 486 U.S. 281, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897 (1988) (discussing limitations of this
provision).
76 19 U.S.C. S 1337 (Supp. 1997). See Ghosh, supra note 7, at 402-07 for a discussion of the limits of
this provision.
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markets, in 1998 the European Court of Justice relied upon trademark law
to restrict gray markets in the European Community." At issue was the
resale of fashion sunglasses distributed outside of the European Union in
Austria. The court held that such resale diluted and infringed upon the
trademark for the sunglasses authorized to be sold within Austria. This
recent opinion parallels developments in United States law that rely on
intellectual property law to prevent gray market goods. Although trademark
and copyright laws have historically been relied upon to challenge gray
marketers, the United States Supreme Court cast a fatal blow to copyright
theories in its recent QualityKing Distributors,Inc. decision, holding that the
first sale doctrine is a valid defense for gray marketers.7 8 However, plaintiffs
in the United States, like the successful litigants in the European Court of
Justice, still have trademark law on which to base their challenges.
1. ComparingReal Spaceand Cyberspace. Gray markets in real space exist
in a legal shadow, seemingly controlled by laws without teeth. The legal
status of gray markets in Cyberspace is equally vague. The uncertainty
offered by the law reflects a fundamental inability to balance the various
interests affected by gray markets, whether in real or Cyberspace. Gray
markets help consumers by providing price competition for branded
products; they hurt consumers when gray market goods are of lower quality
or are not supported by service or warranties. Gray markets hurt
manufacturers by undercutting goodwill and investment in retail
establishments; they help manufacturers by providing competition for the
counterfeit good market, which sells cheap knock-offs of the real product.
Upon close examination, the same tensions arise with gray markets in
Cyberspace.
A gray market in Cyberspace is the unauthorized distribution of a
product.79 More challenging issues relating to gray markets arise in the
medium of Cyberspace because the product being distributed through an
unauthorized channel is information. Suppose I develop a multi-page

' Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int'l Schmied. GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlaver Handelsyesllschaft mbH,
1998-7 E.C.R. 1-4799.
7 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 148-49, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1961, 1967 (1998).
"' In real space, the product is a good, a manufactured product sold through retail outlets.
Cyberspace, of course, can facilitate the gray markets which exist in real space; for example, K-Mart or
Sam's Club could have a website on which gray market goods are distributed. However, this use of the
Internet would best be viewed as merely an extension of gray markets in real space.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1999

31

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 2

. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 7:1

website detailing the history of the British Royal Family. The site is filled
with details that I have uncovered, and each page contains advertisements for
myself and my genealogical skills. A fellow cyber-citizen arrives and creates
another website, which contains links to the pages on my website that have
the juiciest details of the dalliances of the Royal Family; the links skip over
the fascinating historical details I have uncovered and, more importantly,
allow the reader to skip over the advertisements for myself. My contention
is that links of this sort create a gray market in information. Just as real
space gray markets transport goods from one region to another, Cyberspace
gray markets transport information from one part of the Internet to
another.8 !
2. ContractingIssues and Web Linking.8 1 As described above, United
States law has performed poorly in answering the question of the rights of
gray marketers. This difficulty has arisen because of the problem of finding
the proper balance between consumer and producer interests. In the
Cyberspace arena, a similar balancing problem arises. The owner of a
website can finance the site generally through three different ways:82 (1)
subscriptions by users of the site; (2) goods or services sold on the site; and
(3) advertisements placed on the site. Access to websites funded by
subscriptions are limited through the use of a password required for entry.
For such websites, linking has no effect, because the need for a password
prevents entry. Websites that are funded by the sale of goods and services
can be linked to and arguably are aided by the gray market created by the
link. Finally, websites that are financed by advertising face the greatest risk
of harm because linking can allow users to circumvent the advertising on the
site. The appropriate legal regime for gray marketing entails balancing the
potential harm to websites that are financed by advertising with the gain to
websites financed by the sale of goods and services. Analogously, the legal
regime governing gray markets in real space entailed, in part, balancing the

" Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason & Hal R. Varian, Economics FAQs About the Internet, in INTERNET
ECONOMICS 27,28-29 (Lee McKnight & Joseph P. Bailey eds., 1997); and Martyne M. Hallgren & Alan
K. McAdams, The Economic Efficiency ofinternet PublicGoods, in INTERNET ECONOMICS 455, 466-77.
" For a discussion of the contracting issues, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, WEB-LINKING
AGREEMENTS: CONTRACTING STRATEGIES AND MODELPROVISIONS (1997) (providing model terms for
a web-linking contract presuming that contracts are used to create rights to link).
I For a discussion, see O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace, supra note 3, at 625-29; AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, supranote 81, at 21-26. For other pricing schemes, see Mackie-Mason & Varian, supra note
80, at 52-54.
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loss of investment in goodwill by the manufacturer with the potential gains
from preempting the counterfeit good market.
The effect of gray markets in Cyberspace on consumers is equally
compelling. One indirect consequence is that website owners seeking to
protect themselves from gray marketers may switch to subscription-based
systems, thereby raising the direct cost of using sites for consumers.8 3 The
use of subscription sites would be accompanied by greater use of contract
through web-linking agreements.8 4 A switch to subscription-based systems
would also raise indirect costs to consumers, particularly the cost of
searching for information on the Internet. The benefits of linking, on the
other hand, are the reductions in the search costs faced by consumers because
consumers are capable of accessing information more quickly. However, in
some instances linking, if it occurs through the use of frames," may alter the
manner in which the information is displayed and indirectly alter the
content of the information as interpreted by the consumer. Just as gray
marketers in real space can often sell goods that are materially different from
the domestic product with the same brand, gray marketers in Cyberspace can
materially alter information through the technologies of framing and linking.
The countervailing effects on consumers of gray market information in
Cyberspace are analogous to the effects on consumers of gray market goods
in real space.
But the question arises: is not linking from one website to another in
Cyberspace different from the selling of trademarked goods through
unauthorized channels? While linking may affect the market for advertising
or the market for online transactions, the heart of the issue concerns the
right to control the distribution of information to the public, not the right
to control interests in market transactions. Put another way, classifying
linking as a gray market-like transaction presupposes that Cyberspace should

" See O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace,supra note 3, at 627 (discussing the subscription-based model);
Burk, supra note 14 (discussing copyright infringement on the Internet).
84 For a discussion of the contracting issues involved when contracts are used to create linking rights,
see AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 81.
85 Framing potentially alters the information because framing places the information on the linked
site within borders that may contain advertisements and other information that could clash with the
linked information. For example, the advertisements in the borders may be that of a competitor with the
owner of the information from the linked site.
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be commodified, as opposed to a non-market denominated commons
regulated by custom and informal law. 6
My response is that the gray markets in real space are also subject to the
critique of commodification. At the heart of the gray market transaction is
the question of whether cross-border transactions should be commodified or
left open, unregulated, and not subject to market transactions. The "gray"
in gray market transactions applies to the space between regional markets.
If the manufacturer divides real space into regional markets, can he also
commodify the space between regional markets through which gray market
goods flow? In Cyberspace, the gray market is the "space" between websites,
over which links aid in jumping. My gray market analogy does not presume
commodification; the analogy raises the difficult question: how pervasive
should commodification be?
The word "market" should in part be viewed metaphorically to describe
a particular interaction between the provider of a good, service, or
information and the receiver.
Whether the interaction becomes
commodified will depend largely on the legal response, but the result can be
perverse. A decision, for example, to allow the gray market (i.e., to permit
linking without the need for permission) would lead to more subscriptionbased websites, especially if advertisers are concerned that links would allow
users to bypass advertising. The result of a decision in favor of gray
marketers would result in further commodification of Cyberspace.
Similarly, requiring gray marketers to obtain permission, a result that could
be reached either by imposing a compulsory license on owners of websites,
or by allowing website owners to enjoin links, would further commodify
(and balkanize) Cyberspace. Commodification is seemingly inevitable under
either legal regime governing gray markets.
3. The Possible Legal Regimes for Cyberspace. The previous analysis
simplified the range of interactions and markets, both actual and potential,
that would be affected by linking. To better understand the interactions, I
turn to three bodies of law that can be used to regulate Cyberspace: (a)
Copyrights and Trademarks; (b) contract and property; and (c) sui generis
regulation. I will analyze each more deeply in Part mH.c below. For present

86 See Radin, Property, supra note 4, at 510 (discussing the implications of the commodification of

Cyberspace); Rose, supra note 8, at 135 (discussing the underlying facts that instigate the creation of
property rights in a resource).
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purposes, I will discuss each of these three bodies of law to deepen the
analogy between gray markets in real space and those in Cyberspace.
a. Copyrights and Trademarks. Copyright law is designed to provide
protection for original expressions from unauthorized copying." Trademark
law is designed to provide protection for distinctive names and symbols used
to designate the source of a good or service."8 Both bodies of law, directly or
indirectly, protect the content of the expression, name, or symbol.
Copyright law, while offering no protection for ideas or methods or
processes, can prohibit the dissemination of original expression through
literal or non-literal copying. Trademark law protects the informational
value of a name or symbol by prohibiting copying of a name or symbol in
a way that creates actual or potential confusion by consumers. Recent
developments in the federal law of trademarks also protect the informational
value of names and symbols by protecting trademark owners from blurring
or tarnishment of the mark. 9
The extent of protection through copyright and trademark law is defined
by market parameters. To obtain either damages or an injunction under
trademark law, the owner needs to show the likelihood of confusion among
consumers.9" Critical to demonstrating the likelihood of confusion are
defining the relevant consumers and identifying, through survey evidence,
recognition by the consumers of a distinction between the mark and the
source. Challenges to trademark validity and defenses to infringement can
hinge on demonstrating that the name or symbol has become generic to
designate the product and therefore no longer designates its source. 9 ' The
claim of "genericide" will also hinge on the proper definition of the good or
service. Analogously, in the context of copyright law, defendants argue that
a particular copying of the protected work constitutes fair use, a defense that
rests in part on the effect of the copied work on the market for the protected

7 17 U.S.C. S 106 (1994).
" 15 U.S.C. S 1114 (1991).
'915 U.S.C. S 1125(c) (Supp. I 1997).

91 DONALD S. CHISUM & MAICHAELJACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLEcTUAL PROPERTY LAW S

5[F11] (likelihood of confusion as requirement for damages or injunction); Id S 5[F]3Ie] (actual
confusion required for an award of damages).
" See, e.g., Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding "aspirin" to be a
generic term and therefore not protected by trademark law).
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work.92 Although copyright and trademark rights are often discussed in
property terms, the extent of such rights in each case will hinge on
understanding and discerning market effects.
Surprisingly, the question of market definition in the context of
copyrights and trademarks has received little academic or practical
attention. 93 This lack of focus on the definition of market surfaces as gaps
and sometimes confusion in the case law. Two examples from copyright law
illustrate such confusion. In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,'
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) held that
photocopying by Texaco's research scientists of technical journals published
by American Geophysical had an adverse effect on the market, because such
unlicensed copying foreclosed the creation of a market for licenses between
subscribers and publishers. 9 In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit (Ninth Circuit) in Sega EnterprisesLtd. v. Accolade, Inc.96 held that
copying of a competitor's computer program for the purposes of reverseengineering constituted fair use, even though, arguably, such copying could
also be licensed. 97 I am convinced that the Ninth Circuit's ruling is correct,
and the Second Circuit's specious. What is troubling is how courts can
engage in the kind of circular reasoning evinced by the American Geophysical
Union opinion when analyzing the market effects in copyright cases.
When copyright fair use analysis is applied to gray markets, the
underlying confusion continues. In determining the effect that linking has
on the market, one has to begin with isolating the proper market. The three
pertinent markets are (1)the advertising market, (2) the market for the goods
92 The fair use defense, codified at 17 U.S.C. S 107 (1994), allows certain infringing uses of
copyrighted materials to be immune from liability for copyright infringement. The defendant using the
defense needs to show that his use of copyrighted works is protected under a balancing test. The test
requires a balancing of four factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, whether it is commercial or
non-commercial; (2) the nature of the protected work, whether it is fictional or factual; (3) the amount
of the copyrighted work used; and (4) the effects of the use on the market for the copyrighted work. See,
eg., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073 (1985)
(recognizing harm to the market for the protected work as an important factor in determining fair use).
" In contrast with the area of antitrust, where market definition is the crucial question, both
academic commentators and practitioners have neglected to define "market" when speaking of market
effects in the context of copyright and trademark law.
60 F.3d 913, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (2d Cir. 1994).
9 Id at 931.
9' 977 F.2d 1510, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561 (9th Cir. 1992).
"[W]here disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied
in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access,
disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law." 977 F.2d at 1527-28.
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and services sold on the website, and (3) the market for the website and its
information content. The first two markets are the simplest to define and
analyze, since both involve traditional transactions. However, linking has
opposite effects on each market. Linking can undercut the advertising
market by allowing consumers to avoid advertising placed on a website. In
contrast, linking can promote and complement the market for goods and
services sold on the website by reducing the transaction and search costs
associated with finding the products. Thus the market effects in a fair use
analysis for linking are mixed.
The effects are confounded by the analysis of the third market, the
market for the website and its information content. This third market is not
structured in terms of traditional market transactions; in fact, the product is
best classified as an "impure public good," one that can only be partly
excluded from consumption by others. Though linking increases the value
of the website by making it more accessible, it could also lower its
informational value through dilution."
The effects of controlling gray marketing in Cyberspace through
copyright and trademark law are difficult to disentangle without clearer
definitions of what constitutes the relevant market. For gray markets in real
space, the relevant market for copyright purposes is, after the rec'ent Quality
KingDistributors,Inc. decision, the global market.99 For trademark purposes,
there has always been a tension between universalist theories of trademark
and territorial theories, a tension that translates into the appropriate
geographic definition of the market. In Cyberspace, because of the different
types of transactions implicated and the crucial question of whether
Cyberspace is to be commodified, the problems regarding market definition
are exacerbated and cast further doubt on the applicability of copyright law
and trademark law to limit gray marketing.
b. Contractand Property. Contract law and property law provide
background rules that permit market transactions in real space. To the
extent that Cyberspace is to be commodified, contract law and property law
will play crucial roles. Contract law will govern basic transactions and

For an example of dilution in the trademark context, see Chemical Corp. of Am. v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that "Where there's life ....
there's bugs" diluted the trademark owner's "Where there's life, . . . there's Bud").
Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 145,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1961, 1965 (1998).
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provide default rules to help in the enforcement of promises. Property law's
role is more complicated, since Cyberspace is clearly not a real property
system.
But certain fundamental notions of property, such as
misappropriation and conversion, will offer foundational rules for allocating
rights in Cyberspace. As in real space, property and contract can work in
tandem to protect current entitlements and future expectations.
The role of contract law and property law in Cyberspace gray markets is
as confounding as the role of copyright and trademark. Contract law
protects subscription-based websites, since the sale of the subscription in
Cyberspace is analogous to sales of subscriptions to a service in real space.
To the extent that permitting gray markets leads to a greater use of
subscription-based sites, contract law will provide the legal foundation for
such sites. Sites supported by advertising and sites promoting the sale of
goods and services are also protected by the law of contract, but it is far from
clear that contract law would protect such sites against gray marketers.
Arguably, linking to sites in a way that permits the circumvention of
advertising is a tortious interference with the advertising contract between
the website owner and the advertiser. But such a conclusion would, in many
jurisdictions, be a stretch of existing law."° Website owners may attempt
misappropriation claims against the creator of the link, but under existing
case law, misappropriation claims would be limited because of preemption
by federal copyright law 01° and the problem of market definition. Thus,
contract law and property law would effectively provide little protection
against gray marketing through linking.
The analogy with gray markets in real space is clarified by consideration
of the role of contract law and property law. Contract law cannot directly
stop the gray marketer, because of lack of privity of contract. Contract law
works in a responsive way by allowing manufacturers of the product to
prevent gray marketing through their pricing policies (i.e., avoiding
discriminatory pricing). Property law is more limited in responding to gray

0 Contract claims in gray market cases in real space have been successful in only two reported cases:
Railway Express Agency v. Super Scale Models, Ltd., 934 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1991); DEP Corp. v. Interstate
Cigar Co., 622 F.2d 621, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (2d Cir. 1980).
101See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 318-19, 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649,
652-53 (1st Cir. 1967) (stating in dicta that misappropriation claims are limited because of preemption by
federal copyright law). The classic preemption cases are Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 140
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 528 (1964).
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marketing in Cyberspace than in real space because the property interest
affected is difficult to define in Cyberspace. The difficulty with using
contract law and property law to regulate gray markets reflects the
fundamental problem in any regulation of gray markets: defining the
underlying market that is affected by the act of gray marketing.
c. Sui GenerisRegulationofthe Gray Market. In real space, sui generis
regulation of the gray market takes the form of state and federal statutes that
directly prohibit the sale or importation of gray market goods. As discussed
above, such sui generis protection has been largely toothless, because the
statutes are either under-enforced or subject to substantial exceptions. In
Cyberspace, analogous sui generis protection would be in the form of
statutes restricting linking or rules regulated by Network Solutions, Inc., the
private organization currently managing the registration and use of domain
names, that require licensing or otherwise police linking. Because of the
conflicting interests affected by linking, such regulation would have the same
effect as the rules governing gray markets in real space."0 2
The above discussion of the potential legal regimes to govern gray
marketing demonstrates the parallels between gray markets in real space and
in Cyberspace. In the next section, I discuss the legal implications for gray
markets in Cyberspace.
C. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR LINKING

1. Copyright. What lessons are to be learned for Cyberspace from the
legal treatment of gray markets in real space? In the area of copyright law,
the argument might be made that the analogy is strained and is not helpful.
Copyright protection against gray marketers in real space is limited by the
first sale doctrine. When the manufacturer sells the good in the overseas
market, whether as part of a licensing agreement or as a part of a retail sale,
the first sale doctrine holds that he has exhausted all the rents he can acquire
from the copyrighted work. 3 Thus, the gray marketer can re-sell the
copyrighted work with impunity.
In the context of Cyberspace, the first sale doctrine has limited
application. By placing information on my website, I have not in any sense
exhausted the rents that I could make from the sale of the information.
102See supra Part IHL.B (discussing rules regulating real space and Cyberspace).

1o, 17 U.S.C. S 109(a) (1994).
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Information placed on the Web is placed there for storage, available for later
retrieval by the user, and potentially for a fee. By linking to the site, the
gray marketer may reduce the rents to be made from the sale of the
information and may expropriate it. However, gray marketing in
Cyberspace through the use of links is not protected by the first sale
doctrine, because linking is not a sale.
Even though the first sale doctrine is inapplicable because placement of
information on a website does not constitute a sale, other aspects of
copyright law are still applicable. At least three copyright rights are
implicated by linking: (1) the right to exclude others from making copies of
the work, (2) the right to exclude others from making derivative works, and
(3) the right to exclude others from publicly performing and displaying the
work. The first two rights have been analyzed extensively in the
literature. " Linking to a website potentially infringes the copyright owner's
right to exclude others from copying because the link literally creates a copy
of the website on the accessed server. Linking may alsofacilitatecopying by
users themselves who can print out pages from the website; such facilitation
could constitute contributory infringement.' 5 Furthermore, by placing the
information on the website in a new form either through framing or by
incorporating the website in the linker's page, linking can violate the
copyright owner's right to exclude others from creating derivative works.
The rights of public performance and display have not been extensively
discussed even though both are assuredly affected by linking. The public
performance right encompasses the right to perform or transmit the work
publicly. The display right encompasses the right to display the whole or
part of the work to the public. Linking raises two crucial questions in the
context of these rights: (1) what do the rights relating to performing,
transmitting, or displaying mean in the context of a website? and (2) when
is a performance, transmittal, or display made publicly?
The first question is relatively easy to answer. The loading of a website
onto a browser window would constitute a display and the transfer of the
information from the website's server should constitute a transmittal.If the
104 See O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace, supra note 3, at 655-58 and the articles cited therein
(exemplifying the notion of Cyberspace as an extension of real space).
Direct infringement is prohibited under the Copyright Act in 17 U.S.C. S 501 (1994).

Contributory infringement, or the imposition of liability for the direct copyright infringement of
someone else, has developed through case law. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 443, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 678 (1984) (stating that videotaping constitutes fair use).
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linked site contains any audio-visual work, activating the work would
constitute a performance. However, the difficulty raised by linking is that
the link merely facilitates the performance, transmittal, or display. If the
user merely entered the URL of the linked site, and thereby loaded the site
onto his browser, no infringement of the performance, display, or
transmittal right occurs. Linking is no more an infringement of these rights
than sending an e-mail containing a URL to a colleague is.
On the other hand, linking may be analogized to the wired performance
system at issue in On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries,"° which involved the familiar system used in motels of
transmitting motion pictures to a guest's room upon request. Such systems
often involve the guest selecting from a menu a channel which transmits the
desired movie to the television set contained in the room. The district court
for the Northern District of California held that such a system infringed the
motion picture owners' copyright in the films.""7 A website that contains a
menu of links to other sites is arguably no different from the infringing
system in On Command Video Corp.
The right of performance and display extends only to transmittals that are
made "publicly." The Copyright Act defines "publicly" to mean "at any
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a
family and its social acquaintances is gathered."0 8 The transmittal to the
public may be in a form that will allow members of the public to receive the
performance or display "in the same place or in separate places and at the
same time or at different times.""09 A transmittal can be public even if the
performance or display does not occur at the same time or place. An
infringement of the right to perform or display publicly can occur even if
individuals view the performance or display in seriatim. This qualification
creates special problems for linking. Individuals accessing the link can
accumulate into a public performance or display even if each transmittal is
to an individual user.
However, the case law is far from clear regarding the definition of what
constitutes a public performance or display. While a wired performance
system to a hotel room does constitute a public performance, renting videos

"o'

777 F. Supp. 787, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (N.D. Cal. 1991).

'0' Id. at 791.

1' 17 U.S.C. S 101 (1996).
109 d
d
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to hotel guests to play on video recorders in the room may not be an
infringement.11 The difference between a wired performance system and a
videocasette may hinge on what "public" means. One commentator has
suggested that public be understood in terms of the common law right to
exclude. "' Places from which an individual can exclude the public should
constitute a private place; places where the ability to exclude is limited
should be deemed public. As applied to linking, if much of the linking
occurs in the sanctity of one's home or the shared sanctity of one's
workplace, the resulting performance or display is not public. One court,
however, has held that transmittal of information onto an electronic bulletin
board does constitute a public display.' Although this case suggests that the
location of the user may not be dispositive, the decision can be distinguished
from linking. Transmittal to a browser is distinguishable from transmittal
to an electronic bulletin board, which is open to the public like a display case
in a storefront window. Transmittal to a browser via linking occurs through
the discretion of the user, and, as pointed out above, is substantively the
same as the user typing in the URL and connecting to the desired site.
Even though the first sale doctrine does not sanction gray marketing in
Cyberspace, as it does in real space, it is far from clear that gray markets in
Cyberspace infringe on copyright rights. Gray marketers provide access to
information in ways that may skirt the limits of copyright law, because of
the technology of copying and transmittal and because of the meaning of
public in the context of Cyberspace. Even if rights are infringed, gray
marketers in Cyberspace would have a very strong fair use defense. The
elements of that defense have been analyzed extensively in the literature.113
I will focus on the elements of fair use in light of my analogy with gray
markets.
The fair use defense has rarely been relied upon by gray marketers in real
space. Prior to the Quality King Distributors,Inc. decision," 4 the first sale
doctrine offered a more viable line of defense. It is not even clear that gray

1o

Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 641 (3d Cir.

1984).
.. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHTS 5:134-6 (2d ed. 1996).
112 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1827 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
.. See Willie Skinner, PreventingGrayMarkets:Is Copyright Law the Solution?,26 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L
L. & COM. 315, 332-36 (1999) (analyzing the limits of fair use defense in gray market cases).
11 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1961
(1998).
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marketers in real space would have a successful fair use defense. Since the
gray marketer's infringement is in the context of a commercial use of the
copyrighted work, it is very likely that on that prong alone the fair use
defense will fail. The fact that gray marketers directly compete with the
manufacturer in the United States market would also weaken the fair use
defense. However, since linking does not implicate a commercial use, gray
marketers in Cyberspace would have a stronger line of defense. Links
typically have not been sold to the public; therefore, unlike the gray market
sale of products, linking does not implicate a commercial use. Even if the
site that contains a link is a subscription site, requiring users to pay to obtain
access, the link may be such a small part of the entire site that the link may
not be the primary item of sale on the site. Arguably, even as part of a
subscription-based site, linking would not constitute a commercial use;
115
rather, it would be a means of low-cost information retrieval for users.
A use of a copyrighted work is not a fair use if it has an inordinate effect
on the market for the copyrighted work. This limitation creates some
perplexing problems for linking in Cyberspace. The most obvious one is
that of defining the relevant market that is affected by linking." 6 Website
...
In some instances a first sale defense may arise in gray marketing in Cyberspace. In Storm Impact,
Inc., discussed infra Part rH.D, the court held that the repackaging of Shareware was not fair use because
it affected the market of the copyright owner. Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F.
Supp. 2d 782, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266 (N.D. Ill. 1998). In cases in which linking itself may be for sale,
a similar argument could be made that such linking would not be fair use, especially if the linked
information is given away for free. Alternatively, in Futuredontics,Inc., also discussed infra Part III.D, the
court left open the possibility that framing could constitute the creation of a derivative work.
Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2005 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
.16In fact, this is a perplexing problem for most fair use analyses. In American GeophysicalUnion, the
Second Circuit found that unauthorized photocopying inordinately affected the market for copyright
licenses. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (2d Cir.
1994). As pointed out through the American Geophysical Union opinion, a market for copyright license
presupposes the need to license the protected work; based on the assumption that a license is required, a
court found that the copying was not a fair use. Id at 929-3 1. The circularity of the Second Circuit's
reasoning could be resolved in the following way: a court is more likely to find infringement if there is
an existing set of market relationships that would be affected by the unauthorized use. For instance, in
the context of the photocopying at issue in American GeophysicalUnion, the court looked to the existence
of the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) as an existing market mechanism for the sale of photocopying
licenses. Contrast the analysis with that in Sony Corp. ofAmerica, in which the United States Supreme
Court held that videotaping was fair use. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665 (1984). The Court based this holding on the fact that videotaping permitted
valuable time-shifting. But, of course, the argument could be made that private videotaping could hurt
other markets, such as those for videotaped movies and pay-per-view services or other satellite broadcasts.
However, none of these markets was developed at the time of the Sony Corp. ofAmerica decision. The
intriguing question is whether the Sony Corp. of America decision would have been the same if the
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owners can restrict access to sites by requiring subscriptions for entry. Links
cannot be used to circumvent the requirement of needing a password in
order to enter. Linking presumptively does not affect the market for the
information contained on the site or for the site itself. For websites financed
through cybershopping, where the site is actually a "store front window" for
electronic commerce, linking would actually enhance the market for the
products sold on the site. The effect of linking would be analogous to
opening up another entrance to a shopping mall or increasing the number
of parking spaces. Furthermore, a firm is better off having a new store, even
a competing store, opening in the same mall as opposed to the same store
opening in a mall some distance away. 1 7 A new store in the same mall
would increase the amount of foot traffic while a new store in a different
mall would ceteris paribus steal customers. In terms of the market for the
information content of the site and the market for the goods actually sold on
the site, linking has either no effect or a positive effect.
The market for advertising could be adversely affected by linking.
Linking permits the user to circumvent any advertisements that have been
purchased on the linked site. A simple rule would be that linking is fair use
ifit does notpermit the user to circumvent advertising. The problem with such
a rule is that linking arguably could expose the advertisement to a wider
audience, just as linking permits a wider audience for cybershopping. A user,
after linking to a page in the site that lacks advertising, can still page through
the linked cite and come across the advertising. 8 Concluding that
circumventing advertising through linking is a commercial harm would be
tantamount to saying that since consumers can skip over the advertising in

invention of the VCR for private home recording had come after such technological and market
developments.
This last consideration, while admittedly counterfactual, has important implications in how linking
should be treated. Linking should be treated more like the VCR in Sony Corp. of America than the
photocopying in American Geophysical Union. In the context of linking, markets that could be affected
by permissive linking have not yet developed. Thus, courts find themselves in situations where the
treatment of the new technology will affect the development of market relations. For reasons elaborated
in this article, the more permissive stance of Sony Corp. ofAmerica is appropriate for Cyberspace issues
such as linking.
117 For a discussion of this point and the relationship between growth, development, and complex
systems, see PAUL R. KRUGMAN, THE SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY 22-29 (1990) and PAUL R.
KRUGMAN, DEVELOPMENT, GEOGRAPHY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 40-41 (1995).

"' These are the terms of the debate in TicketmasterCorp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 97-3055 DDP (C.D.
Cal. filed May 9, 1997). See discussion supra note 62, and Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc.,
45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2005 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see also infra text accompanying notes 148-153.
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newspapers and magazines, advertising has no effect. Thus, just like in
printed media, advertisers in Cyberspace would respond to linking by
creating more open and lavish advertisements, ones that would be more
difficult to circumvent. Whether such responses would constitute an adverse
effect on the market remains an empirical question, based in part on
consumer response and in part on the costs of advertising.
Market effects in the context of fair use have never hinged on detailed
cost-benefit analyses of markets. Instead courts have used the market effects
prong of the fair use analysis as a basis for discussing the policy of requiring
the licensing of copyrighted materials. The policy is analyzed against the
background of existing institutional arrangements for the licensing of
copyrights. The policy of consumer benefits is also considered, especially in
terms of the effect of the infringement on the demand for the copyrighted
work. The difficult question in the context of new technological or
institutional environments is gauging the effect of infringement on potential
markets. In considering markets that have not even been contemplated or
that are undeveloped, courts must confront the conflicting effects of
copyright. On the one hand, property rights are needed for the formation
of markets; on the other hand, if property rights are too strong, innovation
and the creation of new markets may be hindered. Courts have resolved this
tension, in part, by finding that reverse-engineering is a legitimate basis for
fair use." 9 In other contexts, courts have based their determination of fair
use on whether the infringement actually complements existing markets, as
opposed to creating substitutes. The VCR provides an example of this
approach. In holding that video recording constituted fair use, the United
States Supreme Court, in part, concluded that such use complemented the
distribution and sale of copyrighted works in the broadcast media.120 The
finding, however, was based on empirical evidence, as well as influences from

119See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1974) (discussing

reverse-engineering in the context of trade secret law). Although the United States Supreme Court has
not directly addressed the issue, most lower courts do find reverse-engineering to be fair use under
copyright law. See, interalia, Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1561 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that disassembly of a copyrighted computer work for study or examination
of unprotected aspects of the computer program constitutes fair use).
1 See Sony Corp. ofAmerica, 464 U.S. at 423-24. The Court found that the video recorder permitted
time-shifting, a use to which the copyright owner did not have exclusive rights. Because video recording
permitted time-shifting, the audience for broadcasted works expanded.
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the nature of the use and its relationship to existing markets for broadcast
media. 2' 1
Against this background, linking would likely have little effect on the
advertising market and would likely constitute fair use. As suggested above,
linking may actually complement the advertising market by providing a basis
for wider consumer exposure to advertisements. Furthermore, in light of
Sony Corp. ofAmerica, the fact that consumers can circumvent advertising
through linking may not be crucial for the fair use analysis. In fact, the
holding in Sony Corp. ofAmerica is directly applicable to linking, because
home use of the VCR permits the user to ignore, even excise, the
advertisements from broadcast programs. Since at the time of the Sony Corp.
ofAmerica decision, broadcast programming was overwhelmingly funded by
advertising, it stands to reason that if videotaping constitutes fair use, then
so should linking. Linking exemplifies in space the type of time-shifting that
was crucial in Sony Corp. ofAmerica for the Court's finding that videotaping
constitutes fair use.'22 In fact the analogy with broadcast media is stronger.
Subscription sites are the equivalent of pay television (TV). Copying of pay
TV programs would less likely constitute fair use. In fact, such copying is
impossible to achieve since pay TV signals are broadcast scrambled. It is
technology that prevents copying, just as it is the requirement of a password
for access to subscription sites that prevents linking.
2. Trademarks. Trademark law has been used against gray marketers in
real space. Cases against gray marketers in real space have hinged on
whether the gray market goods are materially different from similarly
trademarked goods sold for the domestic market. 23 In undertaking this
analysis, the courts have failed, confusing quality differences, such as those
stemming from tastes, with those stemming from legal and physical aspects
of the product.2 2 The analysis in the context of Cyberspace would be even

...Id at 424-25.

" See supra note 120 (discussing the holding in Sony Corp. ofAmerica).

123See Lever Bros. v. United States, 652 F. Supp. 403, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1820 (D.D.C. 1987)

(holding that prohibition against importation of merchandise bearing trademark owned by United States
corporation did not bar merchandise bearing foreign trademark where foreign and domestic trademark
holders were both subsidiaries of a foreign corporation); Martin's Herend, 112 F.3d 1296 (holding that
trademark infringement under Lanham Act results where foreign goods bearing trademark are imported
by a gray market importer and such goods are materially different from goods sold by authorized seller
of trademarked goods in domestic market).
124 See Ghosh, supra note 7, at 392-97 (concluding that gray marketed goods should be excluded under
trademark law only if goods are inferior to goods marketed through authorized channels).
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less exacting. The basic problem is that gray marketing in Cyberspace
primarily allows the user to obtain the underlying information on the
website more quickly than he would through research using printed media.
Further, linking does not change the information content; therefore, gray
marketers in Cyberspace, almost by definition, are not providing a
materially different product than the product to which they have linked.
Linking may be challenged on the grounds of material difference in terms
of how the information is packaged. Framing may alter the components and
arrangement of the information and, as a result, affect its accessibility. 2 '
This material alteration is largely a question of trade dress rather than
12 6
trademark.
It is substantially more difficult to obtain protection for trade dress than
to obtain protection for trademark. Trade dress is protected if it is
distinctive or if it has acquired a secondary meaning.' Secondary meaning
for trade dress of websites would be difficult to establish, partly because of
how recent the medium is and partly because a user may associate the
arrangement of a website with any particular source.2 8 Because of the
uncertain legal standard, establishing the distinctiveness of trade dress is even
more difficult. Currently, there is a division in the Courts of the Federal
Circuit on how to determine the distinctiveness of trade dress.'29 The

See Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2005, 2007 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (holding that framing may be altering the underlying information and layout and hence producing
a derivative work).
126Trademark law protects marks, symbols, and words that are used to designate the origin of a
product or service. Trade dress law is a subset of trademark law, which protects the design and
configuration of a product that designates the origin of a product or service. For example, the word
"Coke" would be the subject of trademark law, while the design of the bottle, if protected, would be the
subject of trade dress law. CHISUM &JACOBS, supra note 90, at S5[C]2Ic].
17 Secondary meaning applies to marks that are descriptive of the product or service being sold, where
the use of the mark by the public has created secondary associations with the source of the product or
service. For example, the phrase "ever ready" is descriptive of a battery, but also has secondary
associations with the manufacturer of the battery. CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 90, at S 5[CI3Ia].
128 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1081 (1992)
(holding that trade dress that is inherently distinctive is protectable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
without a showing that it has acquired a secondary meaning). For an academic discussion of trade dress
protection for computer interfaces, see Lauren Fisher Kelner, TradeDress Protectionfor Computer User
Interface "Look and Feel," 61 U. Ci. L. REv. 1011 (1994) (advocating trade dress protection for user
interfaces, such as for Apple and Lotus).
12 Compare,e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Silva, 118 F.3d 56, 58,43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375, 1377 (1st Cir.
1997) (acknowledging the United States Supreme Court's extension of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
to claims for infringement of trade dress) witb Kohler v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 634, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1241, 1250 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating "It is apparent, however, that perpetual trademark protection
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various tests developed by the different courts share the idea of functionality;
trade dress is not distinctive if it is a necessary aspect of the product for it to
work.'° Without delving too deeply into the meaning of "necessary for the
design of the product," it seems very likely that a functionality test' is
perhaps underinclusive and would provide trade dress protection to almost
all websites. After all, what is necessary for a website except perhaps for
linear writing on a page so that the content is readable? Even without
venturing into the question of when linking to a website materially alters it,
the more basic question of when a website is protected as trade dress remains.
Because of these two uncertainties, linking will almost certainly be difficult
to contain through the application of trademark law.
The final question remains of whether linking could be protected by
trademark fair use. "2 This argument has been made cogently in the
literature."' Trademark fair use has not been raised in the context of gray
markets in real space and would undoubtedly not be successful, since
trademark fair use applies when the use of the mark is non-commercial or

under the Lanham Act for a product configuration or design is not the equivalent of impermissible
perpetual patent protection").
"50See In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332,215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 9 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(holding a functional design, meaning one that is utilitarian, is not adequately distinctive to warrant
protection). After Two Pesos, Inc., there are three tests used by courts to assess the distinctiveness of trade
dress. The first is what I will call the "intentionality test," which looks to see if the creator of the trade
dress intended to use itas a way to distinguish his product. Knitwaves, Inc.v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996
(2d Cir. 1995) (paraphrasing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1161, 1162 (1995); quoting 15 U.S.C. S 1127 (1994)). The second is the "arbitrariness test," which
would accord protection for trade dress if "the features of the trade dress sought to be protected are
arbitrary and serve no function either to describe the product or assist in its effective packaging."
Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702,212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 904,
911 (5th Cir. 1981). Finally, some courts have also used what I call the "market based test," which accords
trade dress protection if "the design, shape or combination of elements is so unique, unusual, or
unexpected in this market that one can assume without proof that it will automatically be perceived by
customers as an indicia of origin." 1 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION S 8.02 [4]
(1992); Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (court ruling pre- Two Pesos, Inc. but cited often on this issue in post- Two Pesos, Inc. cases). For an
excellent comparison of these three tests, see Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (criticizing the intent test, endorsing the market based test, and
applying a combination of the market based test and the arbitrariness test).
131 See supra note 130 (discussing the different functionality tests).
12 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1534, 1538 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that use of a trademark or famous name to refer to a product or
persons, as opposed to branding a product or a service, does not constitute infringement).
t' See O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace,supra note 3, at 681-84 (discussing cases in which trademark
infringement by linking is protected by trademark fair use).
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nominative. Gray market transactions in real space are commercial
transactions involving the sale of goods or services.
Gray market
transactions in Cyberspace are not generally commercial and therefore
would arguably constitute trademark fair use. Though the differences
between real space and Cyberspace demonstrate the trademark law would
not apply, one unanswered legal question is whether the fair use principles
in the context of trademark would translate over into trade dress in an
infringement analysis.
3. Contractand Property. If trademark and copyright fail to restrict gray
marketing, then contract law and property law may provide the key for
website owners seeking to restrict access to information. Such a response,
aptly called by one author the "Lochnerization" of Cyberspace,13 4 parallels
in some ways the response to gray marketing in real space. Early gray
marketing cases turned to trademark law as the basis for excluding gray
market goods; over time gray market plaintiffs turned to state and federal
statutory law affecting imports. Interpretation of the federal law rested often
on principles of agency and contract. Although gray marketing in
Cyberspace has not been attacked through statutes, other than the Lanham
and Copyright Acts, a simple response to gray marketing is through
contract, specifically through the use of subscription-based sites requiring a
password for entry, which would be provided for a fee.
A reasonable prediction is that website owners may switch to
subscription sites if linking is not prohibited. This decision rests on
comparing the respective benefits and costs of subscription sites and open
linking. One would predict that as the market value of the information
contained on the site increases, the likelihood of the site becoming a
subscription site increases. Of course this prediction is based on the
assumption that a market independent of web-based distribution determines
the value of the information contained on the site. For example, distributors
and producers in existing markets for information, such as the market for
print news or broadcast entertainment, will likely turn to subscription sites
if web-based distribution systems are used for the same product. The
difficult question is what will happen to informational products that will be
distributed on the Internet for the first time in an undeveloped market. Will
website owners for new informational products turn to subscription sites, or

"' See Cohen, supra note 2 (coining the phrase based on her title).
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will they open sites with the possibility of creating a gray market for their
information through linking?
The problem rests in part on the economics of information. If a website
is created for distribution of articles from the New York Times and is
authorized by the publisher, consumers will know the nature of the product.
They may not know about the interface that the website would provide with
the news stories, but the reputation of the New York Times would provide
some basis for consumers to believe that the website version would be of a
similar quality. A website for a new netzine (magazines distributed solely
through the Internet) however, cannot rely on such reputation. Instead, as
with any new business, the owner would have to establish a reputation. He
may do this by providing the site for free in order to attract customers. The
owners of new netzines would value linking as a way to expand consumers'
exposure to the product. The costs of open access can be recouped by
switching to a subscription site after a customer base has been established.
Gray marketing through linking can promote markets and property
rights. The final result of permissive linking is not a loss of incentives for
web-based distribution, but the emergence of what has been called a
"Tiebout equilibrium" 5 in real space. Cyberspace will divide into the
equivalent of private clubs, each requiring a subscription to enter. However,
some clubs may be public, especially ones that provide new informational
products. Furthermore, such a system would be superior to a contractual
system. Under a contractual system, website owners would place what has
been described as the equivalent of "No Trespassing" signs on their site
which would serve as a contractual restriction on linking.'36 A violation of
the contract would provide the website owner with an action for breach of
contract. Several authors have discussed the enforceability of such
contracts. 3 ' My comments here extend to the desirability of such a system.
The chief advantage is one of cost; placing the equivalent of a "No
Trespassing" sign on a site is cheaper than putting up a toll booth. However,
the problem is one of enforceability. For example, such a scheme could not
(and the website owner most likely would not want to) discourage
M Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). For an
excellent discussion of Tiebout equilibrium, see CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 9, at 352.
136Hardy, Ancient Doctrine,supra note 3, at 8 (advocating trespass model for linking).
137 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, IntellectualProperty and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239
(1995) (challenging the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses); O'Rourke, CopyrightPreemption,supranote
3 (discussing copyright preemption of enforcement of shrinkwrap licenses under contract law).
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bookmarking'38 the site. Users could circumvent actual linking by simply
copying the URL posted on one site into their bookmark. Even though
there is no direct linking, the result would effectively be the same.
The division of Cyberspace into subscription sites and open sites would
allow the market to sort information based on consumers' willingness to pay
for the information contained on the site. According to some, the result
would be the most efficient provision of information; permissive linking
would facilitate the emergence of Tiebout equilibrium in Cyberspace,
whereby Cyberspace is divided into communities much like real space.139
Just as communities in real space are self-regulating, self-selecting, and may
be, in certain situations, self-replicating, specialized communities in
Cyberspace would have their own rules against a background of contract law
and property law. As I have suggested, some scholars have argued that such
a result would be efficient, since only those willing to pay for the
information will pay. Therefore, only the information for which someone
is willing to pay will be provided. The legal implication of the use of
contract law and property law is the balkanization of Cyberspace.
4. Sui GenerisRules. Sui generis rules for regulating the gray market in
Cyberspace can be of three types. The first type includes statutes that
directly regulate interactions in Cyberspace; such Cyberspace statutes would
be the analogue of state statutes that prohibit the sale of gray market
products. 4 ' The second type includes rules and agreements among Internet
Service Providers. Alternatively, these sui generis rules could be in the form
of norms that arise from interactions in Cyberspace.' 4' This third type of
rule is analogous to the Customs regulations and European Community
directives that govern gray markets in real space. 4 ' I contend these sui
generis rules, in whatever form, will be largely unsuccessful in controlling
gray markets in Cyberspace for many of the same reasons that their
counterparts in real space are. First, the interests implicated by gray markets
are at cross-purposes. The consumer, or end user, benefits do not support

13.

Bookmarking a site means saving the address of the site for retrieval at a later date.

139See infra Part flI.D for a discussion of recent cases that exemplify my gray market analysis.
1" Ghosh, supra note 7, at 405-07; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW S 218-aa (Consol. Supp. 1999); CAL. CIV.

CODE S 1793.1, 1797.80-86 (West 1998).
141 See K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897 (1988); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW S 218-aa (Consol. Supp. 1999); CAL. CIV. CODE S 1793.1, 1797.80-86 (West 1998).
"' Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, S 526(a), 42 Stat. 858, 975 (current version at 19 U.S.C. S 1526 (Supp.
1997)); 19 C.F.R. SS 133.12, 133.21(c) (2) (1999).
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enforcement of rules against gray marketing. Second, the disparateness of
the gray marketers, their potential to benefit the white market, and their
potential benefits to competition militate against enforcement of rules
prohibiting gray markets.
D. IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT CASES: BERNSTEIN, FUTUREDONTICS,INC.,
AND STORM IMPA CT, INC.

Three recent cases illustrate gray markets in Cyberspace and the legal
response: Bernstein v. .C. Penney, Inc.,143 Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied
Anagramics,Inc., " and Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club.'45
In Bernstein, the court summarily dismissed a photographer's claim that
a series of links leading to a site containing an unauthorized reproduction of
one of his photographs of Elizabeth Taylor constituted copyright
infringement. 6 The links began at the website for J.C. Penney that
contained an advertisement for Elizabeth Taylor's Passion perfume, which
linked to a page on the Passion website. This site contained a biography of
Taylor, which then linked to a movie database website separate from J.C.
Penney's site. The linking continued from the movie database website to a
Swedish university's website, which contained the infringing photographs.
The court, without opinion, dismissed the claims against all the named
defendants who constituted the owners of each linked site. Although we can
only speculate about the court's reasoning, the following passage from the
defendants' motion to dismiss is telling: "[B]ecause linking on the Internet
does not constitute copying, and because it serves a substantial noninfringing
purpose, linking (and especially multiple linking) cannot support a claim for
copyright infringement."147

The 1998 decision in Futuredontics,Inc. illustrates an alternative approach
in the context of framing. At issue was an unauthorized framed link to the
website of a dental group from the website of a dental referral service.148 The

50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2005 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
'~s 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266 (N.D. IlM.1998).
14 Bernstein, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1063.
', 16 COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUSTRY A2 (Oct. 6, 1998) (citation to Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. omitted) (the defendant's motion to dismiss appears in its entirety in this
journal).
14 Futuredonics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2005 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
',,
'"
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dental group alleged the framed link violated the group's copyright in the
linked materials. The referral service moved to dismiss, asserting that the
framed link did not create a derivative work and would be a fair use under
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.'49 In that case, the
court held the Game Genie cartridge, which permitted alterations to the
display and performance of a Nintendo game cartridge, constituted fair use
because the Genie cartridge was simply a lens that allowed for a different
view of the Nintendo game.*15 Similarly, the defendants in Futuredontics,Inc.
urged the court to find that a framed link was just a lens through which
Futuredontics' website could be viewed. 1' The court refused to characterize
the framing device in this way."' Instead the court held that the question of
whether the framed link created a derivative work was a question that could
not be determined summarily.'53
The final case in this trilogy is Storm Impact, Inc., which is not a linking
case, but is illustrative of gray markets in Cyberspace. The plaintiff in Storm
Impact, Inc. distributed a skiing game on the Internet as shareware. " The
defendant sold a compilation CD-ROM that contained a collection of the
best shareware available. The conflict was due to the nature of shareware,
which allows users to sample a portion of a software program for a period
of time, after which they must pay the owner of the shareware a registration
fee in exchange for a key to unlock the entire program.' The defendant was
effectively selling what the plaintiff was giving away for free. Admittedly,
the defendant was providing additional value by compiling the best
shareware available into a convenient CD package. But the issue was
whether the defendant was infringing the plaintiff's copyright by putting
6
together the CD.1
The defendant relied on the fair use defense, asserting that its compilation
was a transformative work that did not harm or interfere with plaintiff's

4 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965,22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857 (9th
Cir. 1992).
150
151

Id at 968.
Futuredonics,Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2010.

152 Id,
153 Jd

154 Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782,785,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1266, 1267 (N.D. IMI.1998).
155

Id at 785.

156 Id at 786-88.
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market for its product.' The court rejected the fair use defense, finding for
the plaintiff on the claim of copyright infringement. 8 On the claim of
transformative use, the court found the defendant had simply copied
plaintiff's work onto a CD with other works and had not transformed or
added value to plaintiff's shareware. 9 The court deliberated more on the
question of harm to plaintiff's market for its product than it did on any
other factor. It was troubled by the fact that in none of the other copyright
infringement cases cited by the plaintiff "did the copyright holder place the
material on the Internet, allow limited distribution for free, and attempt to
restrict this free distribution to non-commercial use."' 6' According to the
court, "[p]rotecting material placed on the Internet for free distribution
appears to be a question of first impression." 16' The court was swayed by the
fact that, in its distribution of the shareware, the plaintiff had retained rights
to sell and make commercial distributions of the work.
These three cases exemplify different aspects of gray marketing in
Cyberspace. Bernstein and Futuredontics, Inc. illustrate unauthorized
distribution through linking with the legal conclusion that hyperlinking is
protected, while framing may violate the copyright owners' right to create
derivative works. Storm Impact, Inc. provides another example of gray
marketing outside the context of linking. The defendant is a classic gray
marketer, buying cheap products and reselling them at a higher price. The
case, however, suggests that such forms of gray marketing are prohibited, at
least when the plaintiff has retained the right to make commercial use of its
product. Putting the three cases together, the apparent rule for gray
marketing in Cyberspace is that certain types of gray marketing are
permitted, unless the gray marketer creates a derivative work or usurps the
first sale of the product. Analogously, gray markets in real space are
permitted by the first sale doctrine and constitute trademark infringement
only if the goods are substantially different from the domestically distributed
goods. Conceptualizing the exchange of information and informational
products in Cyberspace as a type of gray market is consistent with the

"s Id at 789-90.
18 Id2 at 790-91.
159

Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266

(N.D. III. 1998).
16
161

Id at 791.
Id.
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emerging legal treatment of information in Cyberspace, whether in the cases
of linking or in the distribution of shareware.
IV. CONCLUSION

The quest for the appropriate model through which to understand
Cyberspace transactions has yielded one basic insight: Cyberspace is defined
by a particular structure of property rights that distinguishes it from both
real property and other intangible property systems. Professor Rose has
dubbed this unique system as one of "limited common property." In this
article, I have built on this notion in demonstrating that many legal
problems in Cyberspace can be viewed as one problem of unauthorized
distribution. I have proposed a gray marketing model as the appropriate one
through which to understand Cyberspace. Once gray marketing is accepted
as the appropriate conceptual model for understanding the distribution of
information in Cyberspace, a strong legal conclusion emerges: information
in Cyberspace should be protected by a regime of weak property rights and
strong protection of public use.
The economic analysis in this article also serves as an antidote to what
Professor Julie Cohen has referred to as the Lochnerization of Cyberspace.
I have suggested in this article an economic rationale for gray marketing: the
reduction of the costs of distribution. The same rationale applies to the
emergence of gray markets in Cyberspace. In a companion article, I develop
the formal economic theory for understanding Cyberspace transactions as
gray markets. In this article, I have presented both the conceptual
foundations and the legal case for a regime of "limited common property"
in Cyberspace, which should shape our formation of Internet policy in the
future.
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